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Contracting for Financial Privacy: The Rights of
Banks and Customers Under the Reauthorized Patriot
Act
Aditi A. Prabhu*
ABSTRACT

The 2001 Patriot Act chipped away financial privacy protections by
allowing law enforcement authorities easier access to bank customer
records. Under the Patriot Act, federal authorities may access customer
records by issuing formal subpoena-like requests under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") or informal national security
letters ("NSLs") to banks while prohibiting notice to any affected
customers. However, the 2006 revisions to the Patriot Act permit banks
to challenge FISA requests and NSLs in federal court before releasing
customer records. While the Act does not require banks to make these
challenges on behalf of their customers, this Article will argue that the
contracts banks sign with their customers-interpreted in light of the
banking tradition of confidentiality and the current regime of federal
and state privacy protections-obligate banks to review government
requests for customer records and file challenges when appropriate.
Furthermore, I will argue that banks and customers should be able to
enter into contracts explicitly obligating banks to challenge FISA
requests and NSLs and that such contracts would be enforceable and
financially feasible.

*Aditi Prabhu graduated from Harvard College in 2004 with an A.B. in Biology and from Yale
Law School in 2007.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 9, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into effect the
USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (hereinafter
"Reauthorized Patriot Act").' Among the many subtle modifications to
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act) (hereinafter "Patriot Act of 2001" or "original Patriot
Act"), the Reauthorized Patriot Act gives a small nod to financial
privacy-a seeming check on the government's power to obtain bank
records without providing customers any notice or the opportunity for a
hearing. Although the Reauthorized Patriot Act still allows the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to request the production of customers'
books and records from financial institutions, a new provision allows
the recipient institution to challenge these requests. 2 Whether this
concession heralds an era of enlarged customer privacy rights wholly
depends on whether financial institutions seize the opportunity to
defend their customers' records from intrusive government searches.
This Article will argue that the newly created right of banks to
challenge law enforcement inquiries should be construed as a duty
rather than a privilege: once empowered, banks are obliged to screen
requests for records and file petitions in opposition, at least under
certain circumstances. Although the text of the Reauthorized Patriot Act
does not explicitly create enforceable rights for customers, its
provisions do not operate in a vacuum. 3 Instead, banks confront
exogenous sources of obligations that should inform their decision of
whether to challenge law enforcement inquiries. 4 Although Supreme
Court precedent indicates that customers enjoy only limited
constitutional protection of privacy rights in financial information

1. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Signs USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act (Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2006/03/20060309-4.html.
2. 50 U.S.C.A § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (West. Supp. 2007) ("A person receiving a production order
may challenge the legality of that order by filing a petition with the pool established by section
1803(e)(1) of this title.").
3. See infra Part III (illustrating that the Reauthorized Patriot Act must be viewed in the
proper historical context, which includes Congress' attempts to heighten customer protections by
passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
4. See infra Part ImLC (explaining that banks have at least an implied contractual duty of
confidentiality to their customers, if not an explicit duty created by contractual language, and that
this duty should help banks decide whether or not to challenge a law enforcement's inquiry into a
customer's financial information).
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voluntarily conveyed to banks, 5 a patchwork of federal statutory
schemes speak to the importance of protecting financial information
from unwarranted distribution. 6 These federal rights are bolstered by
state constitutional and statutory protections. 7 Furthermore, customers
are endowed with contractual rights from the arrangements they enter
into with financial institutions to which they reveal private and sensitive
information. These rights are embedded in both the privacy agreements
signed by banks and their customers and in the expectations created by
8
the nature of the relationship and the customs of the banking industry.
In addition, this Article proposes that banks and customers could
explicitly require banks to challenge law enforcement inquiries,
9
including subpoenas, through clear duty-creating contractual language.
It explores the costs of following through with this obligation given the
frequency of law enforcement inquiries and the costs of raising
petitions.' 0 Finally, this Article examines whether there would be
market demand for these additional privacy protections."
II.

REAUTHORIZED PATRIOT ACT

In passing the Patriot Act of 2001, "Congress set certain more
controversial provisions to sunset at the end of 2005, at which time
Congress would be able to use the experience of the intervening four
years to devise what changes might be necessary." 12 Hence, Congress

5. See infra Part III.A (showing that the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 359 (1967), refused to find a general right to privacy in the Fourth Amendment and that, in
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), the Court held that the search and seizure of
bank records is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
6. See infra Part 11.B (explaining that Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act in
order to protect customers from unwarranted intrusions into their bank records).
7. See infra Part III.B.3 (stating that states such as Colorado, Illinois, Florida, Lousiana,
Marlyland, New Hampshire, and Alabama have taken constitutional or statutory measures to
protect customers' privacy of financial information).
8. See infra Part I.C (arguing that many contracts between banks and customers contain an
explicit duty of confidentiality in the contract and in the bank-customer relationship itself because
the relationship transcends that of a mere creditor-debtor relationship).
9. See infra Part V.A (proposing that the Reauthorized Patriot Act should allow banks and
customers to explicitly contract for assurance that banks will challenge the government's requests
for a customer's financial records).
10. See infra Part VI (using a cautious estimation in order to show that the cost to bank
customers for such protection would be minimal).
11. Id. (arguing that the market for these protections exists among the 150 million bank
customers in the United States).
12. Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA and the PATRIOT Act: A Look Back and A Look
Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC. iii, iv (2006) [hereinafter Dinh]; Charles Doyle,
USA PatriotAct: Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005, CRS Report for Congress at 2
(Jan. 2, 2004) ("Thereafter, the authority remains in effect only as it relates to foreign intelligence
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reconsidered much of the Patriot Act of 2001 in drafting the
Reauthorized Patriot Act. This Article will focus solely on amendments
to the original Patriot Act that implicate financial privacy in the
investigative context. This Part compares three types of requests for
records of decreasing formality-FISA requests, mandatory national
security letters, and non-mandatory national security letters-on the
basis of their historical origins, pre-enforcement safeguards, and post-

issuance opportunities for judicial review.
A. Access to Records under Amendments to FISA
As discussed above, the Reauthorized Patriot Act permits banks to
challenge government requests for customer records. 13 The statutory
authorization for this newly conferred power comes from amendments
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") 14 , which gives the
15
FBI the power to issue confidential requests for financial records.
Notably, Congress originally passed FISA in 1978 to bring greater
congressional oversight to counterterrorism operations. 16 The Act,
which reflected a concern that the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency

("CIA"), and Department of Defense ("DoD") abused their powers
during the preceding decades, constituted a departure from the
independence that agencies charged with protecting national security
had originally enjoyed. 17 In particular, FISA set boundaries on the use
of electronic surveillance and subjected counterintelligence activities to

judicial supervision. 18 Under the FISA framework, FBI agents were
permitted to conduct electronic searches and physical searches only

investigations begun before sunset or to offenses or potential offense [sic] begun or occurring
before that date.").
13. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007); see supra text accompanying note 2.
14. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978).
15. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000 & Supp. 112002).
16. See Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transactional Records: A
PracticalHistory of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 37, 40 (2005)
[hereinafter Woods] (citing Richard A. Best, Jr., Proposalsfor Intelligence Reorganization1949-

2004 (Cong. Res. Serv. RL32500) (Jul. 29, 2004), at 17-25) (stating that Congress was prompted
to control counterintelligence activities because of abuse by the FBI, CIA, and Department of
Defense during the 1960s and 1970s).
17. Woods, supra note 16, at 40 ("The revelation of abuses by the FBI, CIA, and DoD during
the 1960s and 1970s, however, prompted Congress to bring counterintelligence activities under a
higher degree of regulation.").
18. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security

Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1,74-77 (2001).
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after using information gathered by less intrusive techniques to satisfy
the probable cause standard. 19
FISA not only reined in the previously unchecked authority of these
agencies by statute but also spurred societal awareness of the tenuous
balance between the powers granted to law enforcement and the
protections retained for civil liberties. As Michael J. Woods, the former
chief of the FBI's National Security Law Unit and the Principal Legal
Advisor to the National Counterintelligence Executive, reflects: "One
legacy of this period of regulation was an enduring concern that the
tools available to counterintelligence should not be used to subvert the
constitutional protections of criminal law." 20 To address this concern,
FISA created "a 'wall,' built of legal and policy requirements and
reinforced by culture, which separated counter-intelligence officers
21
from criminal investigators."
This "wall" lasted until 2001 when it was dismantled by the Patriot
Act of 2001. The Patriot Act of 2001 amended FISA to allow the FBI
to request individual financial records in the course of antiterrorism
investigations 22 and prohibited financial institutions from notifying their
customers of any such requests. 2 3 This provision was among the most
contentious extensions of federal law enforcement authority in the
original Patriot Act. As Woods speculates, "[p]erhaps no provision of
the Act has generated more controversy than § 215, which authorizes
the FBI to seek a court order compelling the production of 'any tangible
things' relevant to certain counterintelligence and counterterrorism
24
investigations."
Under section 215, the FBI can obtain customer financial records by
applying to a district judge for an order requiring the financial
institution to produce tangible things including records. 2 5 In reviewing
the application, the judge must determine whether the application meets
the statutory criteria, namely a factual showing of reasonable grounds,
19. Woods, supra note 16, at 41 (stating that such less intrusive means include interviews,
publicly available information and "surveillance in areas where no reasonable expectation of
privacy exists").
20. Id. at 40.
21. Id.
22. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
23. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); President Signs USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act, supra note I ("Before the Patriot Act, criminal
investigators were often separated from intelligence officers by a legal and bureaucratic wall.").
24. Woods, supra note 16, at 37 (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287-88
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1862 (Supp. II 2002))).
25. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a) (West 2004) (designating judges to review applications for and
granting orders approving electronic surveillance).
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compliance with so-called minimization procedures, and general
lawfulness.2 6 If the judge concludes that the application satisfies these
requirements, the judge shall enter an ex parte order approving the
release of tangible things. 27 The production order imposes a duty of
nondisclosure on the party requested to release the records. The duty of
nondisclosure is mitigated by a few narrowly construed statutory
exceptions, namely permission to speak to others as necessary to
28
comply with the order and to a lawyer in order to obtain legal advice.
Tucked into the Reauthorized Patriot Act is a provision empowering
the institution from which records are solicited to challenge the
production order by granting judicial review of such challenges by a
specified pool of FISA court judges. 2 9 While providing financial and
other record-keeping institutions with the power to challenge
subpoenas, the Reauthorized Patriot Act does not explicitly require the
institutions to exercise this option. 30 On the contrary, the Reauthorized
Patriot Act pronounces: "A person who, in good faith, produces tangible
things under an order pursuant to this Part shall not be liable to any
other person for such production." 3 1 However, the language is not
necessarily determinative on the question of institutional duty or
liability to customers. Even if banks may not be held liable for their
actual disclosures, their failure to challenge the request in light of the
background system of obligations and expectations preceding the
Reauthorized Patriot Act may be an independent basis for a procedural
injury.
B. National Security Letters
Along with the formal mechanism described above, investigative
agencies may also issue National Security Letters ("NSLs"), which do
not require pre-enforcement approval by a judicial officer. Under the
NSL process, the agency director may request a financial institution to
26. 50 U.S.C.A. § 186 1(f)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2007) (allowing a judge to grant a petition to
modify or set aside a production order only if the order does not meet the requirements of this
section or is otherwise unlawful); H.R. REP. No. 109-333, at 91 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109_cong-reports&docid=f:hr333
.109.pdf. [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 109-333].
27. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(c)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
28. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d)(l)(A), (B) (West Supp. 2007).
29. H.R. REP. No. 109-333, supra note 26, at 91 (discussing section 106); 50 U.S.C.A. §
1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007) ("The person receiving the production order may challenge
the legality of that order by filing a petition with the pool established by § 1803(e)(1).").
30. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007) (providing that the recipient of a
request for records "may challenge" its legality).
31. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(e) (West 2004).
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produce records by "certif[ying] in writing to the financial institution
that such records are sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes to
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
Congress granted agencies charged with protecting
activities. ' 32
national security the power to issue NSLs in order to allow
counterintelligence agents to obtain transactional information about
investigative suspects. 3 3 When Congress first permitted these agencies
to issue NSLs, it abstained from requiring the recipients of the letters to
comply. 34 Until 1986, it was left to the discretion of the institution
whether to release the requested records on a case by case basis.3 5 In
1986, Congress mandated that financial institutions comply with NSL
requests for records. 36 However, compliance was only mandatory for
the narrow set of record requests where "there [were] specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to

whom the information sought pertains [was] or may [have been] a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 37 In 1993, this
requirement was reduced to "a connection with a suspected intelligence
officer or suspected terrorist or other indication of spying." 38 The
Patriot Act of 2001 promulgated an even more lenient standard,
requiring only "relevance to an investigation of international terrorism
39
or clandestine intelligence activities."
In contrast to the FISA requests described above in Part II.A, the
NSL issuance process involves few procedural safeguards to balance
individual privacy against competing governmental interests. 40 In a
32. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004).
33. Woods, supra note 16, at 41 (defining transactional information as "information that
broadly describes information that documents financial or communications transactions without
necessarily revealing the substance of those transactions," and listing examples of such
transactional information as records of bank accounts and money transfers).
34. H.R. REP. No. 99-690(I), at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5327, 5342.
35. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 404, 100 Stat.
3190, 3197 (1986).
36. Id.
37. S. REP. No. 99-307, at 19 (1986).
38. Dinh, supra note 12, at xx (citing 18 USC § 2709(b) (2000 & Supp. 1112003)).
39. Id.; Jeffrey Rosen, Who's Watching the FBI?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 15, 2007, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/magazine/I5wwlnlede.t.html?ref=magazine ("The F.B.I.
could issue the letters only if senior officials in Washington had a factual basis for believing that
the records pertained to a suspected spy or terrorist. But the Patriot Act diluted these
requirements, allowing F.B.I. field agents to issue the orders on their own say-so merely by
asserting that they were 'relevant' to a terrorism investigation.").
40. E.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b)(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (explaining that the
government will not be prevented from getting the financial records if it determines that delay
would create immediate danger of physical injury to any person, serious property damage, or
flight to avoid prosecution).
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recent journalistic investigation uncovering the widespread use of the
letters, the New York Times reported that "[a]s an investigative tool, the
letters present relatively few hurdles; they can be authorized by
supervisors rather than a court."4 1 Furthermore, there is no formal
mechanism, such as judicial review, before a request is issued to assure
that requests are narrowly tailored and limited to the records of those
42
individuals for whom there is some reasonable basis for suspicion.
One reporter observed that the "[p]assage of the Patriot Act in October
2001 lowered the standard for issuing the letters, requiring only that the
documents sought be 'relevant' to an investigation and allowing records
43
requests for more peripheral figures, not just targets of an inquiry."
Financial institutions may challenge NSLs by a process parallel to
that for requests under FISA. The recipient of the request for records
may petition the district court to modify or set aside the nondisclosure
requirement associated with the request. 44 In addition, the Committee
Report accompanying the Reauthorized Patriot Act emphasized that the
reworded provision authorizing bank challenges "makes explicit that the
recipient of a national security letter (NSL) may consult with an
attorney and challenge the NSL in court." 45 In evaluating such a
challenge, the court's standard of review is narrow and deferential: the
court may set aside the nondisclosure requirement or otherwise modify
the NSL only if it finds that there is no reason to believe that such
changes would endanger national security. 46 Even in light of such a
finding by the court, a high-ranking FBI official may "certify" that the
disclosure would pose a danger, and this certification will be treated as

41. Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Expands Intelligence Role in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/0l/14/
washington/14spy.html?ei=5070&en=efffl09ec71cel8b&ex= 187582400&adxnnl=l&adxnnlx
=1187453401-WIf621Y6iQwAsauubXFQ [hereinafter Lichtblau]; Rosen, supra note 39 ("In
March, a report by the inspector general of the Justice Department described 'widespread and
serious misuse' of national security letters after the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001 significantly
expanded the F.B.I.'s authority to issue them: between 2003 and 2005, he concluded, the F.B.I.
issued more than 140,000 national security letters, many involving people with no obvious
connections to terrorism.").
42. See generally 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) (listing requirements for an
order).
43. Lichtblau, supra note 41.
44. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (b) (West Supp. 2007).
45. H.R. REP. No. 109-333, supra note 26, at 95.
46. See id. (saying that a court may modify or set aside such a nondisclosure requirement if it
finds that there is no reason to believe that disclosure may harm national security; interfere with
criminal, counterintelligence, or counterterrorism investigations; interfere with diplomatic
relations; or endanger the life or physical safety of a person).
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conclusive unless the court finds that it was made in bad faith.4 7 If the
entity does not comply with the request for production following an
unsuccessful challenge, the Attorney General may invoke the district
court to issue an order requiring compliance. 4 8 If the49entity fails to obey
the order, it may be held liable for contempt of court.
The availability of pre-enforcement judicial review of NSLs is
essential to the constitutionality of the process. 50 As in the case of
administrative subpoenas, constitutionality "is predicated on the
availability of a neutral tribunal to determine, after the subpoena is
issued, whether a subpoena actually complies with the Fourth
Amendment's demands." 5 1 An administrative subpoena regime would
not be constitutional if judicial review was not available "prior to
suffering penalties for refusing to comply." 52 In 2004, the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in a decision
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held that the
statutory provision allowing the FBI to issue NSLs to internet service
providers ("ISPs") but denying pre-enforcement review to the recipients
was unconstitutional. 5 3 The ISPs argued that the non-disclosure
provision effectively prevented them from accessing the courts because

47. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(b)(1) (West 2004) ("Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a
Government authority from obtaining financial records from a financial institution if the
Government authority determines that delay in obtaining access to such records would create
imminent danger.").
48. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(c) (West Supp. 2007); see also Brian T. Yeh & Charles Doyle, USA
Patriot Improvement & Reauthorization Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis 14, CRS Report for
Congress (Dec. 21, 2006), availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/inteVRL3332.pdf.zx.
49. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (c) (West Supp. 2007) (allowing the court to issue an order that
requires a person to comply with the request).
50. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated by 449 F.3d 415
(2d Cir. 2006) (stating that an administrative subpoena derives justification from the judicial
process).
51. Id. There are only a smattering of recent cases challenging NSLs, because "[w]ith no
means to enforce or to quash NSLs and with NSLs being issued primarily to third parties with
little reason to refuse compliance, challenges to the issuance of these administrative subpoenas
only occurred after the publicity they garnered with the PATRIOT Act." Dinh, supra note 12, at
xxix.
52. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
53. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the ISP's argument that the
original § 2709 was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it denied preenforcement review and under the First Amendment because "it operated as a content-based prior
restraint on speech that was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest"); see also Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 83 (D. Conn. 2005)
(granting a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the government from enforcing the gag
order imposed on the recipient of an NSL under § 2709(c) because the recipient had demonstrated
irreparable harm from the suppression of speech).
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54
they would need to divulge the receipt of an NSL in order to litigate.

The court agreed, concluding that "what is, in practice, an implicit
obligation of automatic compliance with NSLs violates the Fourth

Amendment right to judicial access." 55 Courts have similarly rejected
law enforcement processes compelling libraries to disclose borrower
records without permitting pre-enforcement challenges. 5 6 As discussed
above, the amended NSL provision in the Reauthorized Patriot Act
allows recipients of the letters to challenge their issuance. 57 Because
the Reauthorized Patriot Act added provisions explicitly permitting
challenges and consultation with an attorney, the second circuit vacated
the NSL process was
the portion of the district court's holding that
58
Amendment.
Fourth
the
under
unconstitutional
While Congress was drafting the Patriot Act of 2001, the government
originally sought administrative subpoena power but received only the
authority to issue letters under section 215. 59 Although NSLs are like

administrative subpoenas in that no judicial approval is required for
authorization, they do not come with a self-executing enforcement
mechanism. 60 Rather, if the recipient of the letter does not comply, the

government must approach a federal court for enforcement. 61

This

suggests that Congress intended the NSL process to confer only limited
54. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
55. Id. (reasoning that it would be naive to think that "NSLs, given their commandeering
warrant, do anything short of coercing all but the most fearless NSL recipient into immediate
compliance and secrecy").
56. Doe v. Gonzales, No. 05A295 (Oct. 7, 2005) (denying emergency application), available
at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nationalsecurityletters/080306ginsburg-opinion-sealed
.pdf (providing that requests for library records are unconstitutional for the same reasons as
internet service provider records in Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Compare Jay M. Zitter, Constitutionality of National Security Letters Issued Pursuant to 18
U.S.C.A. § 2709, 2006 A.L.R. Fed. 2d, at 3 (noting that the NSLs held unconstitutional in the ISP
and library contexts are different than those issued to financial institutions).
57. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415,419 (2d Cir. 2006).
58. Id. (also vacating and remanding the First Amendment portion of Doe v. Ashcroft in
response to the legislative changes).
59. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1,at 61 (2001). Compare Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (providing that the court must enforce an
administrative subpoena unless it is "plainly... irrelevant to any lawful purpose" of the agency).
60. Woods, supra note 16, at 61. Woods points out the distinction between 21 U.S.C. §
876(c), which provides for judicial enforcement of administrative subpoenas, and 12 U.S.C. §
3414(a)(5), which fails to provide for judicial enforcement of NSLs. Id. at n.150; see also Beryl
A. Howell, Surveillance Powers In The USA PATRIOT Act: How Scary Are They?, 76 PA. B.
Ass'N. Q. 12, 18 (2005) (explaining that outside of limited categories, the FBI must get a court
order to obtain records).
61. See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp 2d 471, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated by 449 F.3d 415
(2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that like administrative subpoenas, when a recipient of an NSL refuses
to comply, the agency who sent it can seek a court order for enforcement).

2007]

Contracting for Financial Privacy

authority to government agencies and wished to give courts a role in
balancing law enforcement power with personal liberties.
C. Non-MandatoryNSLs
As discussed in the previous Part, pre-enforcement approval by a
judicial officer is not required for an agency to issue an NSL; rather, the
agency director need only certify to the financial institution that the
requested records are needed for foreign counterintelligence purposes.
Several agencies order NSLs on a regular basis, namely the FBI, the
CIA, and the DoD. However, only the FBI has been authorized by
Congress to issue NSLs with which the recipient is required to comply.
The CIA, DoD, and other agencies may issue NSLs, but because they
lack express congressional authorization, compliance is voluntary and
left to the discretion of the recipient.
In addition to the NSLs authorized by the Patriot Act, the U.S.
military and the CIA have begun issuing "non-mandatory" NSLs as an
extension of their domestic intelligence-gathering operations. The
letters are mostly issued in connection with military or criminal
investigations. The military and CIA lack explicit statutory authority to
issue mandatory NSLs, and Congress has been reluctant to grant this
power because of concerns that they should not be involved in domestic
spying. 62 Inaddition, as Elizabeth Parker, a former general counsel at
both the National Security Agency and the CIA, has observed, the
letters contrast with the "strong tradition of not using our military for
domestic law enforcement" and signify a "mov[e] into territory where
historically they have not been authorized or presumed to be
operating."63 In general, courts have also reasoned that government
surveillance in domestic affairs is entitled to greater constitutional
protection than in the foreign intelligence context. 64 Despite their

62. Posting of Jonathan Winer to Counterterrorism Blog (Jan. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.counterterrorismblog.org/2007/01/ [hereinafter Winer] ("Given that the FBI already
had this authority and has been using it at the rate of some 9000 times per year, it is not clear why
the CIA and Defense Department have needed it. The initial efforts to justify it raise more
questions than they answer."). But see Lichtblau, supra note 41 ("Government lawyers say the
legal authority for the Pentagon and the C.I.A. to use national security letters in gathering
domestic records dates back nearly three decades and, by their reading, was strengthened by the
antiterrorism law known as the USA Patriot Act.").
63. Lichtblau, supra note 41 (quoting Elizabeth Parker).
64. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972)
("Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances
may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.").
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of these letters
questionable validity, officials estimate that 6thousands
5
have been disseminated in the past few years.
Although these requests are admittedly non-mandatory (in contrast to
FISA requests or NSLs issued by the FBI), journalistic investigations
have revealed that financial institutions typically produce documents
voluntarily upon receiving NSLs. 6 6 For example, a noncompulsory
NSL was used to solicit and obtain the financial records of a Muslim
chaplain at Guantanamo Bay, a U.S. citizen who was falsely suspected
of supporting terrorists. 67 Such disclosure raises serious civil liberties
issues: "[W]hen the person under investigation is an American the
justification for doing this without the normal procedural protections of
a law enforcement investigation is hard to understand. 6 8
The fact that the military and CIA are permitted to issue nonmandatory NSLs in a particular context does not mean that Congress
would grant them the authority to issue a mandatory NSL under the
same set of circumstances. Historically, Congress has limited the scope
of the authority to issue mandatory NSLs. When Congress began to
allow the FBI to issue mandatory NSLs, the Senate Intelligence
Committee "concluded that the FBI's mandatory NSL power should be
more limited in scope than what the FBI had been seeking under
voluntary NSL arrangements." 69 Furthermore, although Congress has
given the FBI the right to issue mandatory NSLs, this does not imply
that Congress would willingly give the same authority to other federal
agencies. Indeed, financial privacy statutes now prohibit the transfer of
to
customer information across agencies, implying that Congress wishes
70
information.
of
forms
particular
to
access
have
agencies
which
limit

65. Lichtblau, supra note 41.
66. Id.
67. Karen DeYoung, Officials: Pentagon Probed Finances, WASH. POST., Jan. 14, 2007, at
A 12, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlarticle/2007/01/13/
AR2007011301486_pf.html; see also Laura Parker, The Ordeal of Chaplain Yee, USA TODAY,
May 16, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nation/2004-05-16-yee-coverx.htm
(explaining that officials will not comment on why Yee was accused of espionage and that all
criminal charges against Yee were eventually dropped).
68. Winer, supra note 62.
69. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d
Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original) (citing S. Rep. No. 99-307, at 19-20). The FBI was permitted to
issue non-mandatory NSLs for any records "relevant to FBI counterintelligence activities." Id.
However, the power to issue mandatory NSLs is limited to records pertaining to persons for
whom there are "specific and articulable facts" indicating that the person is an agent of a foreign
power. Id.
70. E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000); Peter P. Swire, The Surprising
Virtues of the New FinancialPrivacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1275 (noting that the Privacy
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III. PRIVACY RIGHTS OF DEPOSITORS IN INFORMATION CONVEYED TO
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures and explicitly mentions the right to be secure in
one's "papers." 7 1 However, the Supreme Court has not interpreted the
Fourth Amendment as protecting information voluntarily conveyed to a
third party.72
To address this, Congress has passed several statutes heightening
customer protections by restricting the circumstances under which
banks can release financial information. 73 In 1978, Congress passed the
Right to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA") to protect bank customers
from undue intrusion into their private records. In 1999, Congress
enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"), which tightened
restrictions on the sharing of customer information and provided
administrative oversight to curb unwarranted disclosures. These federal
enactments and complementary state regimes enumerate express rights
and obligations, which further thicken the historically rich set of duties
that banks owe their customers.
Along with the federal and state legal regimes governing financial
privacy, historic notions of privacy in financial information inform the
reasonable expectations of customers, shaping their interpretations of
institutional privacy policies and the perception of the bank-customer
relationship. 74 Furthermore, banks explicitly take on certain duties by
presenting their customers with privacy agreements guaranteeing that
they will guard nonpublic information. Any discretion reserved by the
bank in such agreements should be reviewed critically by courts
because the contracts are standard forms drafted by the banks and lack
bargained-for mutual intent.

Act has effectively "succeeded in preventing the creation of the omnivorous, unified federal
database").
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.") (emphasis added).
72. E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (stating that customers are not
protected even if they convey information on the assumption that the third party will not convey it
to others).
73. Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
74. See Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (holding
that bank depositors should expect that their information will be kept private).
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A. Limited ConstitutionalProtectionsof FinancialInformation
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
The bare language of the Fourth
searches and seizures." 7 5
Amendment-particularly its inclusion of "papers"-might be
construed as protecting bank depositors from disclosure of their
financial information. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Fourth Amendment narrowly and afforded7 6 little privacy protection to
bank customers in their books and records.
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court declined to infer a
general right to privacy from the Fourth Amendment, reasoning instead
that the contours of privacy rights were generally to be determined by
the individual states. 7 7 However, the Court found that the Fourth
Amendment requires law enforcement agents to comply with the
"procedure of antecedent justification" before engaging in searches and
seizures. 7 8 In Katz, government agents electronically recorded the
petitioner's calls made from a telephone booth. 79 The Court held that
while the government agents exercised restraint in narrowly tailoring
their surveillance, their actions were nonetheless improper because the
agents failed to first obtain judicial authorization. 80 Essential to this
outcome was the Court's recognition that the Fourth Amendment
protected "people, not places" and hence applied to intangible as well as
physical property. 8 1 In addition, the Katz Court focused on whether the
individual had intended to make the information public rather than
where the individual had chosen to store the information. 82 By doing
so, Katz "underscored the crucial role that disclosed but nonpublic
information plays in modern society. '"83 The reasoning of the Katz

75. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
76. E.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (stating that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
information voluntarily revealed to a third party).
77. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
78. Id. at 359.
79. Id. at 348.
80. Id. at 356-57 ("In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search
upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and
voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means .... ).
81. Id. at 351 ("But what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
82. Id.; see also Andrew DeFillipis, Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to
Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1102 (2006) (Katz "began to
articulate an affirmative right to control one's information by symbolic gestures and mutually

recognized norms").
83.

DeFillipis, supra note 82, at 1103.
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decision left open the possibility that customer financial records might
be protected under the Fourth Amendment.
However, in United States v. Miller, the Court closed this possibility
by holding that the search and seizure of bank records does not violate
the Fourth Amendment because "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government." 84 The Court reasoned:
"[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purose
and the
' 5
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed."
As a result, the Court held that the documents copied and seized by
the government agents in the case were the bank's business papers and
not the petitioner's private papers and hence did not merit Fourth
Amendment protection. 86 In deciding not to grant constitutional
protection to these records, the Court relied on its prior holding in Hoffa
v. United States that the Fourth Amendment does not protect "a
wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
'8 7
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."
Although the Miller decision effectively closed off constitutional
avenues for seeking privacy protection for financial records, some lower
courts have avoided the Supreme Court's holding by carving out
privacy protections in analogous cases. For example, in a drug seizure
case, the Sixth Circuit held that individuals retained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of their safety deposit boxes even
though the boxes ostensibly belonged to the bank.8 8 However, when it
comes to financial records per se, it appears that there is little

84. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 751-52 (1971)). But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 531, 546 (2006) ("Even if a customer inevitably takes a
risk that some companies and their employees might break such promises, the Supreme Court
gave prosecutors something much broader: the power to compel the firm to turn over customer
information when the firm seeks to honor its commitment to preserve confidentiality.").
85. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443-44 (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751-52). It should be noted,
however, that financial records, as opposed to opinions about a customer's financial condition,
are not protected under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666,
671 (Neb. 1989) ("[D]eclarations that one's farm is in trouble and that one would lose everything
are expressions of pure opinion protected by the First Amendment . .
86. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443-44.
87. Id. at 443 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
88. United States v. Thomas, No. 88-6341, 1989 WL 72926, at *2 (6th Cir. Jul. 5, 1989).
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constitutional ground on which to argue for the protection of customer
89
privacy.
In the alternative, some courts have reasoned that while customers do
not retain Fourth Amendment rights in information they voluntarily
convey to a bank, the bank itself may be entitled to this protection,
either from its endogenous privacy interests or through transference
from the customer. For example, in finding the earlier NSL process
unconstitutional, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York reasoned that "many potential NSL recipients may have particular
interests in resisting an NSL, e.g., because they have contractually
90
obligated themselves to protect the anonymity of their subscribers."
Some state courts have also given weight to a bank's own interest in
privacy.
In Louisiana, one bank claimed that releasing private
consumer financial information without customer consent would not
only violate the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act but also cause an irreparable
injury to the bank, which feared that it would "surely suffer injury to its
business reputation when its customers learn[ed] that their private
financial information was divulged to third parties without their
consent." 9 1 The state court agreed, stating, "Once this information has
been provided, in contradiction to the dictates of the GLBA, there is no
monetary relief which could compensate such a loss. ' ' 92 Hence, there
may still be a few avenues available to require banks to challenge FISA
requests or NSLs on purely constitutional grounds. However, this
Article will not focus on solely constitutional ideals, as the rights of
bank customers are strengthened by federal statutory protections passed
in response to Miller.
B. Extensive Statutory Schemes
Although the Supreme Court did not recognize a constitutional right
to privacy in one's bank records, Congress may extend individual
privacy rights beyond this minimal constitutional guarantee. 93 Congress
89. Cf.Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) ("Recognizing that in some circumstances
[the] duty [to avoid unwarranted disclosure of data] arguably has its roots in the Constitution ...
."1).

90. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 494 n.118 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 415
(2d Cir. 2006).
91. Union Planters Bank v. Gavel, No. CIV.A.02-1224, 2002 WL 975675, at *2 (E.D. La.
May 9, 2002).
92. Id. at *6; see also Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 51 (1974) ("It is true that in
a limited class of cases this Court has permitted a party who suffered injury as a result of the
operation of a law to assert his rights even though the sanction of the law was borne by
another.").
93. H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, at 28 (1978), as reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9306.
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is cognizant of its ability to expand privacy protections for personal
information, noting in a House Committee Report: "[W]hile the
Supreme Court found no constitutional right of privacy in financial
records, it is clear that Congress may provide protection of individual
rights beyond that afforded in the Constitution." 9 4 Congress has used
its power to provide for some measure of individual control over
information ceded to financial institutions through a series of legislative
enactments over the decades since the Miller decision. 95 This Part will
discuss the two statutory schemes most relevant to financial privacy in
the context of law enforcement inquiries, the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1998, along with state
96
constitutional and statutory protections.
1. The Right to Financial Privacy Act
In response to the rescission of financial privacy protection by the
Supreme Court in Miller, Congress acted to explicitly endow bank
customers with statutory protection for information exchanged in the
course of financial transactions. 97 In 1978, Congress passed the Right
to Financial Privacy Act ("RFPA"), which was "intended to protect the
customers of financial institutions from unwarranted intrusion into their
records while at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement
activity." 9 8 The accompanying house report specifically described the
RFPA as an expansion of privacy protections in reaction to Miller,
expressing concern that the decision "did not acknowledge the sensitive
nature of [financial] records." 99
The RFPA prohibits financial
institutions from disclosing records without notifying affected
customers, 10 0 and requires customer consent absent a search warrant,
judicial subpoena, or formal written request. 10 1 This enactment
94. Id.
95. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 547 ("These state and federal statutes do not provide the full
complement of Fourth Amendment safeguards . . . . Instead they establish a dense web of
accountability provisions, with requirements and procedures that differ according to the kind of
information concerned and the government's asserted purpose in seeking it.").
96. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000 & West Supp.
2002).
97. H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, supra note 93, at 34.
98. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, supra note 93, at 34; Edward L. Symons, The Bank-Customer
Relation, 100 BANKING L.J. 220, 237 (1983) ("In 1978, Congress expressed its determination
that, contrary to the majority opinion in Miller, a bank customer has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his financial dealings with a bank.").
99. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, supra note 93, at 34.
100. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
101. 12 U.S.C. § 3404 (2000) (customer authorization); 12 U.S.C.A. § 3406 (search warrant);
12 U.S.C.A. § 3407 (subpoena); 12 U.S.C.A. § 3408 (written request). When the government
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empowers customers to object when the bank is presented with an
administrative summons or judicial subpoena by filing a motion to
quash or applying to enjoin the soliciting government agency. 10 2 In
addition, banks that violate the RFPA by failing to comply with its
procedural safeguards may be subject to civil liability to the customer
103
whose records were disclosed.
However, the RFPA exempts from its procedural requirements
investigations related to national security, counterterrorism, or foreign
intelligence. 104
The protections above may be bypassed if the
government authority certifies to the financial institution that "there
may result a danger to the national security of the United States,
interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence
investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the
life or physical safety of any person."' 1 5 Hence, the RFPA expanded
customer protections in some areas but also remained deferential to the
investigative powers of federal law enforcement agencies.
As originally enacted, the RFPA granted the FBI the authority to
issue letters requesting records but did not require financial institutions
to comply with the requests. 10 6 Rather, the RFPA tracked traditional
law enforcement procedures that generally require that when the
Government seeks financial records of bank customers as part of a law
enforcement inquiry, it must use a formal written request such as a
subpoena (that is reviewable in court) or obtain a search warrant. 10 7 In
addition, the original RFPA required customer notice unless an order
delaying notice was issued by a judicial officer.10 8 These protections
have eroded over time. The RFPA was amended in 1987 by the
Intelligence Authorization Act "to grant the FBI authority to obtain a
customer's or entity's records from a financial institution for
counterintelligence purposes" in the face of "specific and articulable
facts giving reasons to believe that the customer or entity is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power."' 1 9 Despite this change in the

subpoenas a customer's records, the government must also provide a copy of the subpoena to the
customer and a notice specifying the nature of the inquiry, § 3407(2).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a) (2000) (discussing customer challenges).
103. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (2000) (discussing civil penalties).
104. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
105. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 2007).
106. Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a) (West Supp. 2007).
107. Robert T. Palmer & A.T. Darin Palmer, Complying with the Right to FinancialPrivacy
Act of 1978, 96 BANKING L.J. 196, 211-12 (1979).
108. Id.
109. H.R. REP. No. 99-690(I), at 14 (1986), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5327, 5341.
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evidentiary standard, the RFPA still reflects the importance of financial

privacy as reaffirmed by Congress.
2. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

On November 12, 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
11 0

Act ("GLBA") to modernize the regulation of financial institutions.

One component of this modernization was a reinvigoration of the
central tenet of financial privacy. The GLBA reaffirmed the duty of
financial institutions to guard the privacy of their customers'
information. I 1
Like the RFPA, the GLBA requires financial
institutions to notify customers whose records have been solicited and
to provide an opportunity for affected customers to opt out of the

disclosure. 112 However, it also contains a judicial process exception,
allowing the financial institution to disclose personal information as

necessary to comply with a subpoena, summons, other judicial process,
or as authorized by law.1 13 Unlike the RFPA, the GLBA is focused on
administrative oversight rather than the enforcement of private rights. 114
Although the GLBA does not grant any new rights to depositors in the
face of law enforcement inquiries, its legislative history demonstrates
Congress' intent to preserve and strengthen the relationship between
financial institutions and their customers. Industry groups opposed the
GLBA's tightened restrictions on the sharing of customer
information. 1 15 However, Congress was persuaded by testimony that
customers consider the information they reveal to financial institutions
to be private. The Honorable Edward Gramlich, a member of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, testified that:
110. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified as 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801
(West 2004)).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2007).
112. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: The Financial Privacy Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 313 (2000),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05165fr33645.pdf.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8) (2000 & West Supp. 2007); see, e.g., Ex parte Mutual Savings
Co., 899 So. 2d 986, 992-93 (Ala. 2004) (holding that the trial court could order disclosure of
customer information during civil discovery as part of GLBA's judicial-process exception).
114. David W. Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward Financial Privacy, 4 N.C. BANKING INST.
209, 212-13 (2000) ("[T]he new federal law does not empower consumers to act to ensure their
own interests in such matters. Rather, the law establishes a procedural device and overlapping
regulatory supervisory enforcement mechanisms to identify and correct abusive policies and
practices rather than to remedy or resolve individual rights affected by specific infractions."); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (West 2004) (requiring agencies to "establish appropriate standards for the
financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and... to protect against
unauthorized access to or use of such records").
115. Roderer, supra note 114, at 215.
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Control of information about ourselves is a fundamental means by
which we manage our relationships with each other. The feeling that
financial information should be private has deep historic roots, and
bankers and customers have long viewed their business relationship as

involving a high de ree of trust which could be threatened by
violation of privacy. Ilo

Furthermore, Mr. Gramlich considered whether banking practices
governing the treatment of customer information were evolving too
quickly for customers or market forces to adjust to them.1 17 In light of
these rapid changes and lagging responses, he urged Congress to "strike
' 118
the appropriate balance between these competing interests."
Congress responded with the GLBA, which improved the ability of
customers to exercise control over the dissemination of information
contained in their bank records.
3. State Constitutional and Statutory Protections
Even when interpreting the Fourth Amendment narrowly with regard
to financial privacy, the Supreme Court has cautioned: "Our holding, of
course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on
searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it
chooses to do so."'1 19 State courts in a multitude of jurisdictions have
accepted this as an open invitation to distinguish the applicability of
Miller when they encounter more protective state regimes. 120 For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that while it was bound by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Miller
did not constrict state constitutional protections. 121

116. FinancialPrivacy: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions
and Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Banking and FinancialServs., 106th Cong. 129 (1999)
(statement of Edward Gramlich, Member, Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System),
available at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba58308.000/hba58308_ 1.HTM
[hereinafter Gramlich Statement]. See generally Indiv. Reference Servs. Group, Inc. v. FTC, 145
F. Supp. 2d 6, 18-20 (D.D.C. 2001) (providing an extensive discussion of legislative history of
the GLBA).
117. Gramlich Statement, supra note 116.
118. Id.
119. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,62 (1967).
120. See People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88 (111. App. Ct. 1983) ("A State may of course set
a higher standard of rights than the comparable United States constitutional right .... Colorado,
California and Pennsylvania rejected the rationale of Miller and held that there was a privacy
right in bank records and consequently there was standing."); see also Commonwealth v. Harris,
239 A.2d 290, 292 n.2 (Pa. 1968) ("[T]he state has the power to impose standards on searches
and seizures higher than those required by the Federal Constitution.").
121. Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Colo. 1980); see also Jerome B. Falk, The
State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273, 283-84
(1973) ("For a state court interpreting a state constituion [sic], opinions of the United States
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Many state courts have analyzed the right to privacy in bank records
under Katz instead of Miller.122 In doing so, some have explicitly
declined to follow Miller out of a belief that it "establishes a dangerous
precedent, with great potential for abuse." 123 For example, the
Colorado courts, following the lead of the California courts, applied the
"Katz expectation of privacy test as a measure of unreasonable seizures
under the Colorado Constitution" in determining whether a customer
had the right to challenge a subpoena to the bank for his records. 124 In
an analogous move, the Illinois state courts reasoned that since Katz
held that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in personal
papers is not contingent on his or her location, "the right to privacy is
125
not waived by placing these records in the hands of a bank."'
However, state constitutional protections of privacy in financial
records are typically not absolute and the conferred rights are balanced
against competing policy concerns. In upholding a subpoena that
prevented notice to the customer whose records were solicited, a Florida
state court noted that the bank customers' right of privacy in bank
records was a state constitutional right that yielded to an investigation of
the pari-mutuel industry, which, to be effective, was to be conducted
without notice. 126 However, the court recognized the case as an
exception to the general state constitutional protection of financial
27
privacy. 1
Along with constitutional provisions, many states have enacted
statutory schemes that provide more robust and particularized protection
of financial privacy rights. For example, Louisiana has enacted a
statutory scheme which its state courts have interpreted as imbuing

Supreme Court are like opinions of sister state courts or lower federal courts .... [A] difference in
reasoning should be no more alarming than the differences which impel one judge to dissent from
another's opinion .... ");William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions & the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) ("[Sltate courts cannot rest when they have
afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are
a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law.").
122. E.g., State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-18 (Utah 1991) ("Several state courts have
rejected the rationale of Miller and have held that under their state constitutions, a bank customer
has a privacy right in bank records ....These courts have found the rationale in Katz ...to be
more persuasive than that of Miller.").
123. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979).
124. Charnes, 612 P.2d at 1120; Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Cal.
1974) (relying on Art. I, sec. 13 of the California Constitution).
125. People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88 (11. App. Ct. 1983) (citing Burrows, 529 P.2d at
593-95).
126. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547-48 (Fla. 1985).
127. Id.
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banks with a duty of confidentiality. 128 Banks have statutory authority
to disclose customer records when faced with a subpoena, summons, or
court order, but even for these formal inquiries, the affected customer
must be notified when permitted and given an opportunity to object in a
timely manner. 129 The courts have interpreted this customer protection
broadly: "Thus, although neither statute specifically contains any
language which expressly creates a cause of action in favor of an
individual whose records were wrongfully disclosed, we find that these
statutes create a duty of confidentiality on the part of financial
' 130
institutions in favor of their customers."
Maryland has a more explicit state regime protecting the rights of
bank customers. 13 1 The Maryland legislature was "[a]pparently
disturbed by what it believed to be the trend, out of all scotch and notch,
among banks and other fiduciary institutions to furnish information
without compulsion to government agencies"' 132 and sought to reemphasize the importance of confidentiality in bank-customer
dealings.133 In light of its statutory regime, Maryland state courts have
interpreted the circumstances under which these customer confidences
can be breached very narrowly, limiting banks to disclosing customer
information only under lawful court order or with customer consent,
holding that1 34 "absent compulsion by law, a bank may not make any
disclosures concerning a depositor's account without the express or
135
implied consent of the depositor."

128. Confidential Nature of Financial Information and Financial Records, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:2106 (2000).
129. Burford v. First Nat'l. Bank in Mansfield, 557 So.2d 1147, 1150-51 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
130. Id. at 1151.
131. MD. CODE ANN., Financial Institutions § 1-306(b) (LexisNexis 2003).
132. Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
133. Preamble to Chapter 252(a)(2), 1976 Md. Laws 762-63.
134. Suburban, 408 A.2d at 765 (distinguishing the lower court's jury instruction, which told
jurors that banks may release confidential information when "a matter of public necessity,"
reasoning that it "afforded the Bank more protection than it was entitled to receive"). The
robustness of the rights created by these state statutory schemes is most evident by a comparison
to states lacking such enactments. For example, the Indiana state courts have rejected the holding
of Suburban because Indiana lacks a comparable statutory scheme. In the absence of rights
creating statutory language, the Indiana courts have held that "a person does not legitimately
expect his affairs with third parties to be kept private from law enforcement officers conducting
an investigation." Ind. Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 482 N.E.2d 474, 482 (Ind. App. 1985) (citing In
re Order for Ind. Bell Tel, 409 N.E.2d 1089, 1090 (Ind. 1980)) ("[Blank depositors have taken the
risk in revealing their affairs to third parties that the information will be conveyed by that person
to law enforcement officials, either voluntarily or in response to compulsory process."). Indiana
courts have also held that public duty is sufficient to justify disclosure, even in the absence of
formal process or compulsion by law. Id. at 482 n.4.
135. Suburban, 408 A.2d at 764.
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New Hampshire has a similarly restrictive state statutory scheme,
permitting the inspection of financial records by law enforcement
officials only under a judicial subpoena or summons that describes the
requested records with sufficient particularity. 136 These requirements
go beyond "minimum constitutional requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant." 137 When the state statutory requirements are not met,
bank customers have standing to challenge any evidence obtained
without procedural authorization. 13 8 Alabama has also enacted statutes
which prohibit the disclosure of customer bank records except upon
subpoena or court order. 139 These state enactments not only provide
additional safeguards and courses of action for bank customers but also
underscore the importance of financial privacy in society's collective
consciousness.
C. ContractualObligationsof Banks
The express statutory sources of federal and state privacy rights
discussed above are only a recent addition to the unique relationships
banks and customers have developed with complex allocations of
responsibilities and obligations.
In a departure from the simple
paradigm of a bare debtor-creditor relationship, banks have assumed
roles as agents and fiduciaries, hence implicating the duties of
confidentiality and loyalty.
Many banks have characterized the bank-customer relationship as
more than just that of creditor and debtor. Rather, varying levels of
loyalty and agency have been imputed to banks given the private nature
of financial information. Furthermore, courts have considered the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the bank-customer
relationship in determining that banks entered into implied contracts
with their customers and inferring an implied provision of
confidentiality. Finally, courts have also held banks to their own
guarantees of nondisclosure.

136. Obtaining Records by Search Warrant, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:9 (LexisNexis
1995 & Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:4(I)(c) (LexisNexis 1995 & Supp. 2006).
137. State v. Sheedy, 474 A.2d 1042, 1044 (N.H. 1984).
138. See id. at 1044-045 (granting motion to suppress evidence obtained outside statutory
requirements); State v. Flynn, 464 A.2d 268, 274 (N.H. 1983) (discussing right to challenge
evidence gleaned from privacy violation).
139. Comment to Disclosure of customer financial records, ALA. CODE § 5-5A-43 cmt.
(LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2006).
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1. Implied Duty of Confidentiality
a. Duty of Confidentiality in the Bank-Customer Relationship
Under a classic debtor-creditor relationship, there is no expectation of
privacy. 140 However, courts have hesitated to classify the bank and
customer as merely a debtor and creditor. 14 1
Rather, judicial
descriptions of the relationship operating within the broadly construed
confines of the debtor-creditor model have heightened the classic

conception by inferring a limited duty of privacy: "[T]he relationship
between a general depositor and his bank is that of creditor-debtor, not a
fiduciary relation, but the relation may give rise to some particular

obligation, such as an obligation upon the bank not to disclose matters
pertaining to the customer's account without his consent." 142 Some
courts have harmonized the creditor-debtor and privity aspects of the
bank-customer relationship by distinguishing between the duty of the
bank with regard to the customer's money and to the customer's
records. 143 One reason for this distinction between deposited money

and bank records is the high value placed on financial privacy. 144 As
courts in several jurisdictions have recognized: "Of all the rights of the
citizen, few are of greater importance . . . [than] exemption of his
private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of
others." 145
While some courts have imputed an additional layer of
confidentiality by supplementing the debtor-creditor paradigm, other
courts have relied on a principal-agent model to deduce a duty of
confidentiality. For example, the Idaho state courts have held that "in
discharging its obligation to a depositor a bank must do so subject to the
140. Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Neb. 1989). However, the Schoneweis
court distinguishes between the bank's duty to depositors and borrowers, finding no such duty of
privacy with regard to the latter.
141. E.g., Frame v. Boatman's Bank, 824 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Brex v.
Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. Ch. 1929) (finding additional duties implicit in the relationship
between a bank and its customers).
142. Frame, 824 S.W.2d at 495 (citing Pigg v. Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977)).
143. Brex, 146 A. at 36 ("It may be that the relation of a bank to its depositors is that of debtor
and creditor, but I think it is more than that. As far as the money actually deposited is concerned,
that is true. But, as to the records ... [tihere is an implied obligation ... on the bank, to keep
these from scrutiny until compelled by a court of competent jurisdiction to do otherwise.").
144. See In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 251 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) (describing
compulsory production of private material without judicial process as "contrary to the principles
of a free government").
145. Id. at 250; see also Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479-80
(1894) (discussing demands for the production of documents such as bank records).
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rules of agency."' 146 In so finding, the court cited a variety of cases
across jurisdictions holding that banks must comply with their
depositors' orders. 147 Relying on cases where courts have held banks
liable as agents of their customers with regard to forged checks, the
Peterson court stated that the bank acted as its customers' agent for the
purpose of disclosing information. 14 8 From this characterization the
court inferred that the duty of confidentiality that prohibits an agent
from disclosing information to the principal's detriment applies with
regard to banks disclosing customer information. 149 The court stated:
"[A]n agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to
communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or
acquired by him . *."..
150 Even if a bank cannot be considered a pure
agent of its customers, its role and behavior may give rise to the
expectation that it will accord with the principles of agency in
controlling the dissemination of customer information.
Although courts impute notions of confidentiality and agency into the
bank-customer relationship, they stop short of classifying banks as the
fiduciaries of depositors absent special circumstances.1 5 1 In a fiduciary
146. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 288-89 (Idaho 1961).
147. See, e.g., Dalamatinsko v. First Union Trust & Sav. Bank, 268 Ill.
App. 314 (1932);
Crawford v. W. Side Bank, 2 N.E. 881, 881 (N.Y. 1885) ("[ln discharging its obligation as a
debtor the bank must do so subject to the rules obtaining between principal and agent."). Courts
have also recognized that agency also entails loyalty in executing the principal's orders. Finding
that the relationship of the bank to its customers "was not only that of debtor and creditor but also
that of agent and principal," the court concluded that "[tihe bank owed them the duty of loyalty
which every agent owes its principal." Third Nat'l Bank v. Carver, 218 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1948) (holding that the bank breached its duty in paying a check despite depositor's stop
order). However, agency may not govern all banking transactions. As the Nebraska courts have
distinguished: "A debtor-creditor relationship exists with respect to funds on deposit and a
principal-agent relationship exists with respect to the payment by the bank of checks drawn by a
depositor." Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 69 N.W.2d 861, 866 (Neb. 1955) (citing 9
C.J.S. Banks & Banking § 267).
148. Peterson, 367 P.2d at 288.
149. Philip Blumstein & Linda A. Pohly, Confidentiality, Access & Certainty: Disclosure of
Customer Bank Records, I ANN. REV. BANKING L. 101, 114 (1982).
150. Peterson,367 P.2d at 289 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 395 (1958)).
151. "[T]he relationship of the institution to the depositor is not typically deemed to be
fiduciary in nature. Thus ...absent special circumstances taking it out of the general rule, there is
no aspect of a trust in the transaction." 10 AM. JUR. 2DBanks & Fin. Inst. § 720 (1997). In cases
where customers allege that they have a fiduciary relationship with the bank, they are typically
claiming that the bank had a duty of disclosure to the customer regarding another customer's
financial condition, as opposed to a duty of confidentiality. See, e.g., Hooper v. Barnett Bank of
W. Fla., 474 So. 2d 1253, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("[W]here a fiduciary duty to disclose
may arise under the facts and circumstances, the jury is entitled to weigh this duty to disclose
against the bank's duty of confidentiality ....). But see, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank of
Mobile, 67 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946) (considering banks to be the fiduciaries of their
depositors).
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relationship, the fiduciary has a duty to act primarily for the benefit of
another. 152 Banks are not generally considered fiduciaries because "[i]t
is typically not expected that the bank will exercise its powers primarily

for the benefit of the customer.

Rather, it is more commonly the

expectation that the bank may exercise its power over property
deposited for its own benefit." 153 Although fiduciary relationships are
creatures of contract and malleably turn on the reasonable expectations
of the parties, most courts and scholars agree that the typical conduct of
banks and their customers does not create a reasonable expectation of a
fiduciary relationship. 154 Although banking transactions do not create
fiduciary duties by default, fiduciary relationships are not foreign to the
banking industry and may arise under particular circumstances such as
"a business or confidential relationship which induces one party to relax
the care and vigilance it would ordinarily have exercised in dealing with
a stranger."' 155 Under such circumstances, financial institutions may be
liable for disclosing customer information in breach of the duty of
confidentiality. 156 In addition, a fiduciary relationship can arise from a
"relationship of []trust[] or superior knowledge ....
,157 For example,
as
a bank may have a fiduciary relationship to its customer when acting
158
a financial advisor rather than merely as a depository institution.
Although customers do not benefit from the full protections of a
fiduciary relationship, the concept of agency along with the special
value placed on financial records imputes some privacy protections into
the bank-customer relationship. Some courts recognize that a bank
implicitly agrees to hold customer information in confidence. 15 9 In
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 170 cmt. a (1959).
153. Symons, supra note 98, at 232.
154. Id. at 231 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ I cmt. b, 15 (1958))
(explaining that the bank-customer relationship cannot be considered truly fiduciary because
banks may personally profit from the money deposited by customers).
155. Edward J. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Bank's Liability, Under State Law, for Disclosing
FinancialInformation ConcerningDepositoror Customer, 81 A.L.R. 377, 390 § 7 (1990).
156. Id. (discussing Rubenstein v. South Denver Nat'l Bank, 762 P.2d 755 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988)).
157. Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Barton-Russell Corp., 585 N.Y.S.2d 933, 945 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992).
158. See Gaunt v. Peoples Trust Bank, 379 N.E.2d 495, 496 (Ind.Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing
a duty to act as more than a depositor in unspecified instances); Klein v. First Edina Nat'l Bank,
196 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Minn. 1972) (finding a duty to disclose to counsel only when special
circumstances exist).
159. Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (holding
that absent legal compulsion, the bank could not reveal bank account information to police);
White v. Regions Bank, 729 So.2d 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). Although Maryland has a
protective statutory scheme governing bank records, much of the Suburban court's reasoning was
based on generally applicable historical and contextual reasoning.
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addition, even when the level of dependence and trust placed in the
bank by the customer does not emulate a fiduciary model, courts have
noted that "intimate, private information is not furnished to any bank
official lightly, nor, strictly speaking, voluntarily. . .. The delicately
balanced relationship thus temporarily created is not ... one composed
of equals because of the inordinate power of the bank." 160 Courts have
imputed a duty of confidentiality on banks to counterbalance the
asymmetrical relationship of the vulnerable borrower and the
institutional lender. 16 1 Hence, while banks are not the fiduciaries of
their depositors, they do not enjoy unbridled discretion with regard to
customer records.
b. Duty of Confidentiality Implied in Contract
Courts have recognized implied contracts where the elements of a
contract can be inferred from the conduct of the parties, even in the
absence of a written instrument. 162 Unlike cases where there is no
express contract and the entire agreement must be implied, bankcustomer arrangements are usually formalized through written
contracts. However, the "relations of and the communications between
the parties" may impute additional duties or obligations into the
contract. 16 3 As Edward Gramlich testified to Congress: "In the area of
financial information, many customers clearly believe that an implicit
contract exists between the financial institution and the customer
164
requiring the financial institution to keep information confidential."
Courts have historically found confidentiality to be an implied term
in bank-customer agreements. In 1924, the King's Bench in England
reasoned that when interpreting a contract: "The Court will only imply
terms which must necessarily have been in the contemplation of the
parties in making the contract .... I have no doubt that it is an implied

160. Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank, 646 P.2d 616,619 (Okla. Civ. App. 1982).
161. Id. at 619-20.
162. Marshall Contractors, Inc. v. Brown Univ., 692 A.2d 665, 669 (R.I. 1997); see also
Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 424 (1996) ("[Algreement implied in fact is
'founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is
inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, their tacit understanding."') (citing Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261

U.S. 592, 597 (1923)).
163. Marshall Contractors,692 A.2d at 669; see also U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (2004) ("A course of
dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged
or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify

terms of an agreement.").
164. See Gramlich Statement, supra note 116 (discussing the importance of controlling
financial information to keep it private).
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term of a banker's contract with his customer that the banker shall not
disclose the account . "...165 This notion was adopted by American

banking law, which came to recognize confidentiality as a duty implied
in the contract. 16 6 As federal courts have recognized: "All agree that a

bank should protect [its] business records from the prying eyes of the
public, moved by curiosity or malice. No one questions its right to

protect its fiduciary relationship with its customers, which, in sound
as a matter of common knowledge, is done
banking practice,
' 16 7
everywhere."
Courts in the United States have applied this same line of reasoning

in determining that bank customers maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their dealings. For example, one state supreme court
reasoned that it is implied from the bank-customer relationship that
banks should not disclose customer information without authorization,
and that any unauthorized disclosures could make the bank subject to
liability for breach of implied contract. 168 Giving determinative weight
to implied duties of confidentiality, courts have held banks liable for
breach of contract even when the bank's behavior did not violate any
169
state or federal privacy statutes.

165. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial & Union Bank, 1 K.B. 461, 480 (1924) ("It is an implied
term of the contract between a banker and his customer that the banker will not divulge to third
persons, without the consent of the customer express or implied . . . unless the banker is
");see also 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks & Fin. Inst. § 332
compelled to do so by order of a Court ....
(1997) (discussing banking privacy issues).
166. ZOLLMANN'S BANKS & BANKING § 3413 (Kennth K. Luce ed., Supp. 1954)
("Depositors have a right of secrecy. A bank therefore is under an implied obligation to keep
secret its records of accounts, deposits, and withdrawals."); IAN F.G. BAXTER, THE LAW OF
BANKING AND THE CANADIAN BANK ACT 21-22 (2d ed. 1968) (discussing four exceptions to the
duty of secrecy: "(a) disclosure under compulsion of law, (b) where there is a duty to the public to
disclose, (c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure, (d) where the disclosure is made
with the express or implied consent of the customer"). However, subsequent courts have
recognized only exceptions (a) and (d). E.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284,
289 (Idaho 1961); Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979);
Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. 1929) (listing cases which have recognized the aforementioned
exceptions).
167. United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616, 624 (S.D. Ala. 1946); see also THE
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 346
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1977), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1977privacy/c9.htm
("The balance to be struck is an old one; it reflects the tension between individual liberty and
social order. The sovereign needs information to maintain order; the individual needs to be able to
protect his independence and autonomy should the sovereign overreach.").
168. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961).
169. Taylor v. NationsBank, 776 A.2d 645, 653, 656-57 (Md. 2001) (holding that a bank
which released its customer's records without consent or compulsion was liable for breach of
contract, privacy, and confidentiality but finding no statutory violations).
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Furthermore, the behavior of banks encourages customers to believe
that they are entering into a confidential relationship. Noting that the
existence of a confidential relationship requires both that the customer
trust the bank to hold his information as confidential and that the bank
invite or accept this trust, courts have stated that "banks present a
constant invitation to intending borrowers, and thus subject themselves
170
to whatever implication or obligation is to be drawn from that fact.
For example, as Bryant Bank promises in its Privacy Statement: "At
Bryant Bank, it is trust that is the basis for each customer relationship..
17 1
We believe that your privacy should not be compromised."'
Similarly, First Guaranty Bank states, "A fundamental component of
any relationship is trust that the bank will respect the privacy and
confidentiality of that relationship. First Guaranty Bank understands
and realizes that we have a special duty to our customers to safeguard
and protect your sensitive information." 172 In light of these expansive
proclamations of financial privacy, Congress and various state
legislatures have enacted legislation to enumerate some of the common
expectations of bank customers. 173 Hence, most courts agree that at a
minimum, "a bank has an obligation to its customers not to disclose
unnecessarily,
promiscuously, or maliciously their financial
condition." 174 The Supreme Court has looked to the banking tradition
of confidentiality in holding that the reasonableness of a privacy
expectation depends upon current societal norms and upon the context
175
in which the expectation arose.
Courts are typically sympathetic to customers whose records have
been disclosed without their consent because they do not consider
information revealed to banks by customers as "entirely volitional, since
it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary

170. M.L. Stewart & Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 692 (1924); Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
171. Bryant Bank, Privacy Statement (2005), http://www.bryantbank.com/index.asp?page
=951 (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
172. First Guaranty Bank, Privacy Policy (2006), http://www.fgb.net/PrivacyPolicy.htm (last
visited Aug. 24, 2007).
173. Symons, supra 98, at 245 ("These expectations or perceived needs have arisen either
from implicit or explicit assurances through advertising and other inducements toward an attitude
of trust, or from a perceived community standard of what is right.").
174. Rubenstein v. S. Denver Nat'l Bank, 762 P.2d 755, 756 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
State v. McCray, 551 P.2d 1376, 1380 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976)).
175. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715-17 (1987) (discussing whether an employer's
search of an employee's workplace is considered a violation of the employee's Fourth
Amendment rights).
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society without maintaining a bank account." 17 6 Even the American
Banking Association has espoused the position that, "A bank should, as
a general policy, consider information concerning its customers as
confidential, which it should not disclose to others without clear
justification."' 17 7 Financial records are particularly sensitive because
17 8
"the totality of bank records provides a virtual current biography."'
When providing such extensive information to banks, customers expect
that the information will only be used internally. 179 This view has been
embraced by many jurisdictions. For example, the Supreme Court of
Utah reasoned:
[U]nder an expectation of privacy test, it is reasonable for our citizens
to expect that their bank records will be protected from disclosure
because in the course of bank dealings, a depositor reveals many
aspects of her personal affairs, opinion, habit and associations which
provide a current biography of her activities .... Since it is virtually
impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society
without maintaining an account with a bank, opening a bank account
as conduct which
is not entirely volitional and should not be seen
180
constitutes a waiver of an expectation of privacy.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that borrowers
and depositors have a "right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures" of papers and other information supplied to banks during the
transaction of financial business under a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality. 181
2. Explicit Duties of Confidentiality Created by Contractual Language
Banks and customers may buttress these background notions of
confidentiality by contract. Indeed, some commentators have noted that
instead of pigeonholing relationships into dichotomous categories such

176. Burrows v. Super. Ct. of San Bernardino Valley, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974); see also
Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 546 ("Indeed, the Court's approach paradoxically allows selfprotection by actual criminals (who of course can choose to conduct their illegal transactions in
cash) while leaving the law-abiding citizen with no practical way to shield the privacy of her
daily life.").
177. Compare Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (finding a breach of implied contractual duty for disclosure to third parties)
with 12 C.F.R. § 309.1 (2007) (disclosure of information guidelines for the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation).
178. Burrows, 529 P.2d at 596.
179. See Blumstein & Pohly, supra note 149, at 109-10 (describing the Burrows opinion).
180. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991) ("Such a biography should not be
subject to an unreasonable seizure by the State government.") (quoting People v. Jackson, 452
N.E.2d 85, 89 (I11.App. Ct. 1983)).
181. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (Pa. 1979).
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as debtor-creditor or fiduciary, courts should analyze the bank-customer
relation under a contractual model. 182 Such deference to contracts
would not only better reflect the parties' intent but also encourage more
83
precise contracting.1
Banks currently present customers with privacy agreements that
speak to customer confidentiality in sweeping and deferential terms:
We recognize the customer[s'] right to privacy and consider the
confidentiality and safekeeping of customer information to be one of
our fundamental responsibilities. And while information is critical to
providing quality service, we recognize that one of our most important
assets is our customers[s'] trust, therefore, confidentiality
and
84
safekeeping of customer information is a priority. 1
Such customer agreements invoke notions of privacy that closely
186
185
track the conception of confidentiality espoused in Brex, Burrows,
Suburban,187 and Peterson,18 8 and shape the expectations of customers.
Although banks voluntarily adopt these privacy policies, the promises
of confidentiality and nondisclosure become part of the customer's
expectations, thereby creating enforceable contractual rights.' 8 9 These
privacy agreements also represent a change in expectations of privacy
since Miller was decided thirty years ago. Banks now advertise their
privacy policies and typically allow customers to express preferences
about how their non-public information can be used. As a result,
customers today have a reasonable expectation that banks will not
190
disclose their personal financial information.

182. Symons, supra note 98, at 221-22 (noting that labels such as agent or fiduciary are
"nothing more than specialty contract relations--contract relations shaped by recurring special
facts and circumstances").
183. Id. (arguing that giving greater weight to contractual obligations "may encourage banks
both to provide customers with a written elaboration of the true agreement and to take the time to
be reasonably certain that the important aspects of the true agreement are effectively
communicated .. "); see also id. at 234-35 ("The confidential relation is a prime example of the
courts' failure to utilize contract fundamentals in determining the existence and scope of a
volitional relation. . . . [Tihe confidential relation concept is a creation of a felt need for
restitution where courts believe they cannot find contract.").
184. First Community Bank, N.A., and People's Community Bank, A Division of First
Community Bank, N.A., Privacy Policy (2007), https://www.fcbresource.com/
privacy-statement.cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007).
185. Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34, 36 (N.J. Ch. 1929).
186. Burrows v. Superior Ct. of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974).
187. Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
188. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 289 (Idaho 1961).
189. L. RICHARD FISCHER, EMERGING ISSUES IN THE WORLD OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY,
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION, PLI ORDER NO. BO-00NC, at 347-50 (2000).
190. Cf. Woods, supra note 16, at 42-43 (conceding that "Miller remains the law for now").
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Customers may place great stock in the sense of security generated
by these statements because of their particular concern for financial
privacy. A post-9/11 survey by PC World found customers to be more
resistant to law enforcement access to their financial records (seventy
percent of respondents) than their internet use (sixty-three percent) or
even their medical records (sixty-four percent). 19 1 A contemporaneous
Harris poll also found that more Americans supported face-recognition
technology to scan for suspected terrorists than closer monitoring of
192
financial transactions.

Privacy agreements between banks and customers currently espouse
one of four variations in language, ranging from the most seemingly
lenient ("as permitted by law") to the extremely narrow ("as compelled
by law").
a. Bank-Customer Agreements Using Permissive Language
In its privacy policy, Sovereign Bank articulates: "We may share

certain customer information with government and consumer reporting
agencies as permitted or required by such laws as the Federal Right to
Financial Privacy Act." 193 Similarly, Bank of America states: "We also
may disclose ... Customer Information to credit bureaus and similar
organizations and when required or permitted by law." 19 4 The phrase
"as permitted" has been interpreted narrowly by courts.1 95 When a bank

191. Frank Thorsberg, PC World Poll Highlights Privacy Concerns, PCWORLD.COM (October
5, 2001), http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,64824-page,l/article.html (last visited Aug. 24,
2007).
192. Id.
193. E.g., Sovereign Bank Privacy Policy and Interactive Reporting & Initiation Services
(IRIS) Account Security Overview 5 (2007), http://www.sovereignbank.com/corporate/
downloads/cashmanagement/inforeporting/irisprivacyandsecurity.pdf;
Bryant Bank, Privacy
Statement (2005), http://www.bryantbank.com/index.asp?page=951 ("Bryant Bank will safeguard
your nonpublic personal information and will not sell or share any of your nonpublic personal
information, except as provided in this Privacy Policy and Notice or as otherwise required by
law.").
194. Bank of America Privacy Policy for Consumers 2007, http://www.bankofamefica.com
privacy/index.cfmtemplate=privacysecurcnsmr (last visited Aug. 24, 2007); Chevy Chase
Bank Privacy Pledge, http://www.chevychasebank.comhtm/privacy.html (last visited Aug, 24,
2007) ("We do not disclose any non-public personal information about our customers to any other
third parties, except as permitted or required by law."); Citizens Bank, Notice of Citizens Privacy
Pledge: Our Pledge to You Regarding the Responsible Use and Protection of Customer
Information (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.citizensbank.com/security/privacy.aspx (last visited Aug,
24, 2007) ("You do not have to respond to this notice in any way because we share your
information only as permitted by law or as expressly authorized by you.").
195. E.g., United States v. Terrey, 554 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1977); Peoples Bank of the Virgin
Islands v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1977); West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Va.
1983).
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contracts that it will disclose customer information only when
"permitted" by law, it may not infer permission when the law is silent;
rather, express authorization is necessary. 196 For example, the Federal
District Court for the Western District of Virginia held that the
collection of a service charge by a debt collector, which was not
prohibited under state law, did not fit within the confines of the
"permitted by law" exception since this conduct was not explicitly
sanctioned by Virginia law. 197 This language has been interpreted in
other contexts to limit bank discretion and proscribe the bank's choice
of law. 198 Analogously, language permitting a party to disclose
confidential information during legal proceedings is also construed
narrowly. For example, courts have held that "[t]he Agreement may be
interpreted strictly to require that the confidential information be used
1 99
only in a court, not in settlement talks."
Other banks claim that they will not disclose customer information
except "when authorized by law." 20 0 For example, Jackson State Bank
notes in its privacy statement, "[w]e do not disclose any non-public
personal information about you to any non-affiliated third party unless
authorized by you or we are authorized to do so by law." 2 1 This
language is adopted by the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which
provides that a subpoena may be issued when it "is authorized by law
and there is reason to believe that the records sought are relevant to a
legitimate law enforcement inquiry." 20 2 This language has generally
been interpreted in favor of disclosure, giving considerable deference to
law enforcement authorities. 20 3 Under the GLBA, banks are authorized
to disclose customer information:

196. West, 558 F. Supp. at 582.
197. Id.
198. Terrey, 554 F.2d at 693 (holding that United States Small Business Administration had a
duty to dispose of property in a commercially reasonable manner and that "as permitted" clause
was intended as to limit discretion); Figueroa, 559 F.2d at 917 (holding that a bank could not
volunteer information or respond to unauthorized requests "without breaching duties of
confidentiality and privacy in its dealings with its customers").
199. Interclaim Holdings, Ltd. v. Ness, No. 00C7620, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17945, at *27
(N.D. I11.
Oct. 29, 2001).
200. E.g., The Jackson State Bank & Trust Policy on Customer Confidentiality and Privacy of
Information, http://www.jacksonstatebank.com/custserv/privacy.cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2007)
(describing a typical policy).
201. Id.
202. 12 U.S.C. § 3407(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2007).
203. Irani v. United States, 448 F.3d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The statute creates entitlements
of 'narrow scope' and 'is drafted in a fashion that minimizes the risk that customers' objections to
subpoenas will delay or frustrate agency investigations."') (quoting SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc.,
467 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1984)).
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[T]o comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other
applicable legal requirements; to comply with a properly authorized ...
investigation or subpoena or summons . . .or to respond to judicial

process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over
the financial institution for 204examination, compliance, or other
purposes as authorized by law.

When the bank has received a subpoena or summons, courts
generally find the bank to be "authorized" to comply even if the
customer objects. 20 5 Courts have allowed banks to disclose such
information despite acknowledging the duty of confidentiality. 20 6 In
doing so, courts have ranked the duty of confidentiality as subordinate
to the duty to comply with subpoenas and summons. 20 7 However, IRS
subpoenas differ from FISA requests and NSLs because the statutory
provisions authorizing IRS subpoenas do not permit the bank to
20 8
challenge the request for records.

204. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8) (2000 & West Supp. 2007).
205. Banks have been allowed to simply ignore customer opposition in complying with
subpoenas. Chapman v. Solar, No. 6:05-cv-1789-Orl-18JGG, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 68805, at
*12, *17 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2006) ("'When faced with a petition to quash an IRS third-party
summons, the government need not move to enforce the summons. Instead the government can
rely on the voluntary compliance of third parties to effectuate the summons. . . . ' A summons
issued to a third-party recordkeeper does not generally implicate a taxpayer's privacy rights.")
(quoting Cosme v. IRS, 708 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)). Courts have typically found that
banks "cannot be held liable for breach of a fiduciary duty or for violation of a customer's right of
privacy because of complying with a valid IRS subpoena." Schaut v. First Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 245, 247 (N.D. I11.
1983).
206. Banks may also comply with subpoenas even when they have agreed, under seemingly
restrictive language, to disclose customer information only when "required by law." Jacobsen v.
Citizens State Bank, 587 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding no breach of
confidentiality by bank in complying with IRS summons despite customer's oral and written
instructions to keep information confidential on the ground that federal law preempts the
imposition of liability); see also Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532
P.2d 1263, 1275-76 (Kan. 1975) (upholding disclosure of credit information pursuant to
administrative subpoena); Rush v. Maine Savings Bank, 387 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Me. 1978) (no
implied contractual duty to delay compliance with an IRS summons when summons requests
ordinary information about a loan); Rycroft v. Gaddy, 314 S.E.2d 39, 43 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)
("Communications in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged and are immune from an
action for invasion of privacy.").
207. Dan L. Nicewander, FinancialRecord Privacy-WhatAre & What Should Be the Rights
of the Customerof a Depository Institution?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 601, 631 (1985).
208. "The validity of an IRS summons may come before a district court in one of two ways.
.. Under no circumstance, however, is a summoned party entitled to bring a proceeding to quash
the summons." Judicial Review of a Summons, U.S. Attorneys' Tax Resource Manual 55B (Feb.
2007), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-roornusam/title6/tax00027.htm. Contra 50
U.S.C.A. § 1861(f) (West Supp. 2007) (allowing banks to challenge FISA requests for customer
records); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West Supp. 2007) (allowing banks to analogously challenge NSLs
in court).
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b. Bank-Customer Agreements Using Restrictive Language
Many courts have held that banks may not make any disclosures
concerning a depositor's account without the express or implied consent
of the customer absent compulsion by law. 2°9 For example, the
Alabama state courts consider it "well settled" that a bank cannot
disclose customer information absent consent unless compelled by
law. 2 10 Some banks have also contracted to abide to this narrow
standard of disclosure. 2 11 Notably, a subpoena is generally considered
compulsion. 2 12 When served with a subpoena, the recipient may
respond with a written objection or move to quash or modify the
2 13
subpoena if it requires the disclosure of protected information.
If the recipient objects, the serving party may not inspect or copy any
of the requested records unless the court that issued the subpoena issues
an order to compel the production. For example, in the case of a
subpoena requesting "suspicious activity reports" from the Federal

Deposit Insurance Commission ("FDIC"), the FDIC was required to
challenge the subpoena because a court could not compel production of

this confidential and sensitive data. 214 Hence, there is precedent for this

209. Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A.2d 758, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); see also
Bond v. Slavin, 851 A.2d 598, 608 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (bank improperly produced records
other than those requested in subpoena without consent of customer); see also Peoples Bank of
the Virgin Islands. v. Figueroa, 559 F.2d 914, 917 (3d Cir. 1977) (bank volunteering information
breaches duty of confidentiality).
210. White v. Regions Bank, 729 So. 2d 856, 858 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (internal quotations
omitted).
211. See e.g., Privacy Policy Disclosure, Iowa State Bank & Trust Company (Sept. 2006),
http://www.isbt.com/privacy.php.
212. See Raymond, supra note 155, at § 10 ("In ruling that the borrower could not recover
from the bank for disclosures compelled in a trial from its employee, who responded to a
subpoena duces tecum, the court ruled that when a witness is asked a question, and no objection
is made thereto, or, if made, is overruled, it is the duty of the witness to answer and the witness is
not charged with the duty of determining whether the information sought is relevant or material.")
(discussing O'Coin v. Woonsocket Inst. Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263 (R.I. 1988)). This is true in
other relationships meriting privacy as well, such as patient-doctor confidentiality: "[A]
professional's duty to maintain his client's confidences is independent of the issue whether he can
be legally compelled to reveal some or all of those confidences." McCormick v. England, 494
S.E.2d 431, 434 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing patient-doctor duty of confidentiality). In
addition, in the patient-doctor context, agreements promising that information will not be
disclosed unless "compelled by law" may be breached when justified by "compelling public
interest or other justification," such as the public policy of protecting the welfare of children
through disclosure by physicians. Id. at 437. Hence, courts often interpret the exceptions to these
privacy agreements more broadly than the text of the provisions would suggest.
213. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii).
214. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Flagship Auto Ctr., No. 3:04CV7233, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS
9468, at *16 (N.D. Oh. May 13, 2005) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(2)(B)) (holding that a court
could not compel production of "suspicious activity reports").
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Article's argument that subpoenaed entities may be required to object to
a subpoena to preserve the confidentiality of a third party's information.
The main distinction between the case of the FDIC reports discussed
above and customer financial records is the source of the obligation: the
FDIC's obligations arise under statute while banks' obligations to their
customers are creatures of contract. However, as discussed in the
following Part, banking contracts are contracts of adhesion that should
be interpreted as privately drafted laws.
3. Interpreting Bank-Customer Agreements as Contracts of Adhesion
Because bank-customer agreements are drafted by the bank and
presented to customers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, they are often
considered contracts of adhesion. Since these contracts are not the
result of a bargained-for exchange, they should be treated with
heightened judicial scrutiny. The differences in bargaining power,
knowledge, and experience between the two parties may lead customers
to make decisions that are not fully informed or completely voluntary.
As a result, some scholars recommend that standard form contracts
should not be enforced unless they conform to legislative standards
reflecting fairness and public preferences.
In a landmark paper, Todd Rakoff identified seven factors to consider
in determining whether an agreement is a contract of adhesion: (1) the
contract is printed as a standard form; (2) the contract is presented on a
take it or leave it basis, implying little bargaining power; (3) there is no
bargaining in fact; (4) the seller who drafted the contract is a monopoly;
(5) the product being sold is of necessity to the buyer; (6) the seller is
sophisticated while the buyer is unsophisticated; and (7) the buyer did
not read or understand the terms. 2 15 With the arguable exception of (4),
agreements signed by bank customers appear to share all of these
characteristics. Banking agreements are drafted in advance by the
financial institution and are presented as invariable. Courts and scholars
2 16
have spoken to the essential role of banks to economic life in society.
Consolidating the factors into a simple litmus test, one scholar defines a
contract of adhesion as "that which would be a contract except that no
bargaining power really shapes it." 2 17 Historically, contracts of
adhesion have generally been upheld, except in cases where the terms or
circumstances fall within the traditional exceptions to enforceability

215. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1173, 1177 (1983).
216. Burrows v.Super. Ct. of San Bernadino Valley, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974).
217. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L.REV. 131, 143 (1970).
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such as fraud, inducement, or unconscionability. 2 18 More recently,
courts have expanded upon these historic exceptions by also refusing to
hold the adhered party to such a contract. "Where the other party has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so
if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not
part of the agreement." 2 19 In such cases, courts have severed the one220
sided term while enforcing the remainder of the contract.
a. A Realistic Approach to Contracts of Adhesion
Traditional doctrine proposes that parties should be bound to
contracts of adhesion: because the adherent had an opportunity to read,
his agreement signifies assent to the terms. 22 1 However, this inference
rests on a mistaken assumption about adherents, most of whom do not
actually read or comprehend the presented terms. This behavior is not
mere laziness on the part of customers; rather, it reflects rational
behavior because the terms are not negotiable. 222 Drafters capitalize on
this inherent limitation by supplementing the salient attributes of the
contract with self-favoring terms. 2 23 Accounting for the predictably
self-dealing behavior of the drafting party, one scholar posits that the
traditional equitable gloss on contracts-fraud, duress, and
unconscionability-are inadequate to regulate contracts of adhesion,
analogizing: "[I]t's like bandaging a cut on a broken leg." 224 Given the
utter lack of choice or ability to dicker the terms, contracts of adhesion
should not be taken at face value to be enforceable.
218. Id. at 142-43; see also THOMAS H. OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §§ 9:1, 9:39:4 (2006) ("An agreement may be voided as a contract of adhesion where there are multiple
offending procedural and substantive badges of unconscionability ....
A contract of adhesion is
not automatically voidable ... unless the agreement is unreasonable and never meets the parties'
expectations.").
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
220. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(holding that a contract in which the customer was assumed not to have paid off any of the items
on her credit account until she had paid off all of the items "shocked the conscience" of the
court).
221. Rakoff, supra note 215, at 1184 (citing Lewis v. Great Western Railway, 5 H. & N. 867,
157 Eng. Rep. 1427 (Ex. 1860)); see also Rakoff, supra note 215, at 1185-87 (discussing and
critiquing the historic approach); KARL LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING

APPEALS 370 (1960) (arguing that blanket assent can be inferred from agreement because of the
signor's opportunity to read).
222. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003) (observing that, in reality, customers
"are boundedly rational decisionmakers" who will normally price only "a limited number of
product attributes" as part of their purchase decision).
223. Id. at 1203.
224. Leff, supra note 217, at 148.
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b. Contracts of Adhesion as Private Lawmaking Meriting Judicial
Scrutiny
Standard form contracts can be analogized to privately made law
because they impose legally enforceable duties. 22 5 Lawmaking by
private entities like financial institutions is non-majoritarian and clearly
non-democratic.
Regulations promulgated by such a process are
legitimate only if they conform to standards that are arrived at
democratically and reflect the public interest. This principle is
prevalent with regard to administrative agency decisions, which are
upheld only when they conform to intelligible principles set forth by the
democratically elected Congress. 226 Whether contracts of adhesion
conform to publicly determined standards is a helpful heuristic to figure
out whether they should be enforced. As one commentator has argued,
requiring conformity to such standards would serve public welfare
because the standards would be based on the factors considered most
relevant by customers and industry groups. 2 27 Along with fears of selfdealing and one-sided terms, comparative institutional competence may
also favor delegating the allocation of risks to popularly elected bodies:
"Legislatures are likely to be more institutionally competent to consider
the preferences of the entire range of contracting parties than judges
who... consider[] individual disputes."228 For contracts of adhesion to
be enforceable under a public law framework, it is necessary to
establish the legitimacy of delegating some lawmaking to private
parties.
In the case of bank-customer relations, Congress has legislated to
hold banks to duties beyond those which banks freely assume in their
dealings with customers. 22 9 As a matter of public policy, banks must
keep customer information confidential outside of particular enumerated

225. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts & Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971).
226. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding
that the statute did not breach the non-delegation doctrine because the delegation of legislative
authority was not absolute as it was limited by time, required subsidiary administrative policy
allowing for assessment by public and courts of adherence to legislative intentions, enabled
meaningful judicial review, and was required to be fair, generally applicable, and equitable). But
see Schecter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating a statute for violating the
non-delegation doctrine for delegation of authority to private individuals coupled with a lack of
procedural safeguards or substantive standards of judicial review).
227. Slawson, supra note 225, at 536.
228. Korobkin, supra note 222, at 1249.
229. See supra Part III.B (discussing the attempts by Congress to expand privacy protections
for personal information through the Right to Privacy Act of 1978 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1998).
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exceptions. 2 30 Judicial review is essential to determining whether
individual contracting systems conform to such legislative standards.
Although courts typically uphold contracts unless their provisions are
egregious enough to be considered fraudulent, induced, or
unconscionable, 23 1 courts should apply a more scrutinizing standard of
review to contracts likened to private lawmaking. One argument in
favor of a more critical approach to contracts of adhesion is that in
striking down contracts of adhesion, courts would not be striking a blow
and coercive
to freedom of contract generally because of the peculiar
2 32
into.
entered
were
agreements
these
means by which
Contracts are based on a meeting of the minds and embody the
intentions of the contracting parties. 233 Hence, proponents of the
critical approach encourage courts to parse contractual provisions
closely to discern which ones reflect shared intent. 234 In enforcing
contracts, courts generally honor the reasonable expectations of the
parties. 23 5 Courts should be particularly cognizant of those expectations
in cases of contracts of adhesion, where the written contracts with their
lengthy standard-form language and non-dickered terms are uniquely
unlikely to reflect what the adherent expected from the relationship. As
one proponent recognizes, the context of a transaction, not merely the
written language on a standard form, shapes the reasonable expectations
2 36
of the parties.

230. Symons, supra note 98, at 245 ("These obligations have been imposed based on a
legislatively determined sense of fairness and reasonableness established to protect expectations
or perceived needs.").
231. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2007) ("Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code]
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement."); see also id. at § 2-302
("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.").
232. Slawson, supra note 225, at 541 (concluding that "[tihe standard form is not a contract").
233. ROBERT E. ScoTr & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW & THEORY 676 (3d ed.
2002)."Because parties incur contractual liability only if they make a voluntary, informed
promise, contractual obligations can be said to arise out of the parties' consent. . . . [Tihe
autonomy and economic justifications of contract law presuppose a vital connection between the
parties' intent and the obligations contract law enforces." Id.
234. Slawson, supra note 225, at 541.
235. E.g., id. ("[O]nly the expressions, or manifestations, of consent of the contracting parties
should be called the contract and should be enforced, generally, without question."); see also
Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1992) ("In general, the
reasonable expectations doctrine authorizes a court confronted with an adhesion contract to
enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties under certain circumstances."). See generally
Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (discussing that the reasonable expectations principle
consists of applicable rules).
236. Slawson, supra note 225, at 544.
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c. Particular Vulnerabilities of Contracts of Adhesion
The greatest discord between contractual provisions and customer
expectations may be reflected in clauses expressing how the institution
will behave in case of a particular contingency. Courts should exercise
heightened vigilance in enforcing such contingent clauses because they
are the least likely to be read or understood by customers since it is
"notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and broad
experience concerning the particular transaction type, to appraise these
Of particular concern with regard to
sorts of contingencies. '"237
disclosure provisions is that customers are likely to ignore or
undervalue risks with a low probability of occurrence because they are
unrealistically confident in their ability to escape harm. 238 The risk of
being suspected or targeted in a counterterrorism investigation is
perhaps as unfamiliar or unimaginable to most people as it comes.
Hence, customers will systematically undervalue any protections
proffered by banks ex ante and are unlikely to notice when banks grant
themselves considerable leeway to disclose customer information to law
239
enforcement authorities.
Knowing that customers lack the willingness and ability to evaluate
contingent terms such as disclosure procedures, banks realize that only a
few terms will engage customer attention and need to be drafted in a
favorable manner. 240 As a result, the adhering party is "frequently not
in a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author
of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because
all competitors use the same clauses." 24 1 To the extent that courts
uphold such terms, they are merely sanctioning the "[u]se of form
contracts [which] enables firms to legislate in a substantially
authoritarian manner" without any political accountability. 2 42 Instead
of espousing a uniform presumption of enforceability or

237. Rakoff, supra note 215, at 1226.
238. Korobkin, supra note 222, at 1232-33 ("[Pleople often assess risk via the 'availability
heuristic,' judging risk to be high when the type of harm is familiar or easily imagined and low
when it is not."). Contra Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration& the Windfall Principle of Contract
Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1991-92) (arguing that courts may not be any more wellpositioned to allocate risks of unexpected contingencies than the parties drafting the contracts).
239. Contra What Price Privacy?, CONSUMER REPORTS, May 1991, at 356 ("There's no
conspiracy afoot to deny Americans their rights or start Big Brotherish monitoring of our
activities. Instead, privacy is being slowly eroded. 'The potential threat is large. ... But it's hard
for people to get worked up about it because the erosion is usually quite subtle."').
240. Korobkin, supra note 222, at 1225-27.
241. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629,632 (1943).
242. Id. at 640.
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unenforceability of form contracts, some commentators favor a more
nuanced approach under which the legal response would depend on the
"social importance of the contract" and the "degree of monopoly
243
enjoyed by the author."
Instead of conditioning enforceability on conformance to societal,
democratically-developed standards, a more draconian appriach to
contracts of adhesion is considering adhesive terms to be presumptively
unenforceable. This approach has been proposed by one scholar who
questions judicial deference to adhesive contracts in light of who their
drafters are, noting that "[b]usiness firms do not much resemble the
types of voluntary organizations to which the law gives great
deference." 244 This suggests that judicial review, either under the
historic deference to contracts of adhesion or even under heightened
scrutiny may be insufficient to efficiently protect customer expectations.
The two approaches may often lead to a shared outcome since "many of
the terms in typical form documents are specifically designed to
displace clear rules of law that would otherwise govern the
transaction" 245 and such terms would not be upheld under a litmus test
of conformance. One possible middle ground may be to treat contracts
of adhesion as informative in determining parties' rights rather than
directly enforceable on their terms; standard forms and the expert
judgments they reflect could be treated as "possible evidence of what
the legally implied terms should be, rather than as an independent basis
246
for enforcement."
Critics of contracts of adhesion acknowledge that forcing institutions
to abide by socially sanctioned terms, which they may gloss over by
drafting contracts in a vague or complex manner in a more permissive
regime, may result in higher prices. 24 7 However, many prefer higher
prices over enforcement of contracts that do not conform to customer
expectations. 24 8 As one might infer, "[i]f the point is that onerous terms
are justified by an apparent consumer preference for low prices, it rests
dynamic that leads adherents to
on a failure to perceive the institutional
24 9
terms."
visible
on
exclusively
focus

243. Id.at 642.
244. Rakoff, supra note 215, at 1240 (arguing that considering standard-form contracts to be
presumptively enforceable would not endanger freedom of contract among individuals).
245. Id. at 1183.
246. Id. at 1247.
247. Korobkin, supra note 222, at 1260.
248. Rakoff, supra note 215, at 1247.
249. Id. at 1264.
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4. Banks as Private Enterprises Drafted into Law Enforcement by the
State
Courts often police bank-customer agreements that give banks wide
discretion to disclose customer information to commercial entities such
as marketers. In contrast, courts are more deferential to privacy
agreements that permit the bank to disclose customer information to
government entities. However, agreements that allow banks to disclose
customer information to law enforcement authorities should also be
judged with heightened scrutiny because customers may not have
willingly and knowingly agreed to the terms. Policymakers have not
clarified why the government is covertly soliciting this information
from banks rather than acting publicly as its own agent subject to the
controls of the electorate.
On one hand, the government may be wary of soliciting private sector
firms such as banks to collect information about its citizens because
society is often more skeptical of the motives of profit-maximizing
corporate entities. 2 50 However, since the collection and dissemination
of information does not appear to be closely linked to any profit-making
end, it seems unlikely that there would be any greater skepticism toward
the motives of a private rather than public entity. Furthermore, since
customers are not notified when their records are solicited, the private
institutions remain largely immune from public criticism. 25 1 Allowing
the government to draft private enterprise into its national security
operations without publicly acknowledging this partnership is
particularly dangerous because, unlike market-regulated private entities,
the government may be cavalier about the risks involved in its behavior,
justifiying its actions as "in the public interest" despite the potentially
2 52
adverse effects.

250. Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices & Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private
Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1459 (1982) ("A different quality or depth of
indignation might be aroused by the company that hazards health 'for profit' than by the public
laboratory that does so in the pursuit of science, and whose successes would be more ratably
shared among the whole population.").
251. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d)(1) (West Supp. 2007).
252. Stone, supra note 250, at 1459 (citing the Tuskeegee study in which syphilis was
"studied" instead of cured and the leukemia exposures from testing nuclear weapons); see also
Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 66 (1974) ("It is conceivable, and perhaps likely, that
the bank might not of its own volition compile this amount of detail for its own purposes, and
therefore to that extent the regulations put the bank in the position of seeking information from
the customer in order to eventually report it to the Government."). But see id. at 48-49 ("Banks
are therefore not conscripted neutrals in transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their continued availability and acceptance.").
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Privatization can be a strategic move to avoid the high visibility that
accompanies overt state action. After all, public awareness may well be
followed by an unfavorable response by the electorate. 2 53 The
government is considered an agent subject to control by the public,
unlike private organizations such as financial institutions. For example,
a program that explicitly required individuals to report all of their
financial transactions to a central data-gathering government agency
would create a much greater public outcry than a government policy of
secretly requesting the same information from banks. 254
By
implementing an indirect program, the government is capitalizing on the
difficulties any principal (in this case the public) faces in monitoring its
agent (in this case the government), particularly when the agent's
actions are shrouded in confidentiality and outsourced to complicit
255
private entities.
Furthermore, non-compulsory NSLs are being issued by agencies that
could not get access to records through the usual avenues of interagency cooperation or congressional mandate. 256 This may reflect the
reality that it is often easier for a public agency to change the behavior
of a private organization than of another public agency. 25 7 However,
the fact that the CIA and DoD could not obtain congressional backing

253. Stone, supra note 250, at 1467 (noting that the public may be less keen on punishing
government entities because the penalties would be drawn from taxpayers' pockets).
254. For example, the government long kept its phone monitoring program under wraps.
ABC News: Good Morning America, Government Monitoring About 200 Million Phone Calls,
(May 11, 2006), http://www.abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1948927&page=l ("In all their
comments about the eavesdropping program, U.S. officials never revealed that they were
involved in this massive collection of telephone data."). When word of government surveillance
leaks, it is generally met with opposition from public watchdog groups. In response to the FBI's
"Carnivore" program, which monitors email traffic and can intercept the email of criminal
suspects, the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed suit challenging its legality. Complaint
5-6, Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Justice, No. 00-CV-1849 (D.D.C. July 31, 2000),
available at http:llwww.epic.org/privacylcarnivorelcomplaint.pdf (citing FBI's System to
Covertly Search Email Raises Privacy, Legal Issues, WALL ST. J., July II, 2000).
255. Robert Schmul, Government Accountability & External Watchdogs, ISSUES OF
DEMOCRACY 21, 24 (Aug. 2000), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journalslitdhrlO800lijde/
ijde0800.pdf.
256. See supra Part II.C (discussing the ability of the CIA, Department of Defense, and other
agencies to issue voluntary NSLs).
257. J.Q. Wilson & P. Rachal, Can the Government Regulate Itself?, THE PUB INTEREST 3-4
(Winter 1977); Stone, supra note 250, at 1502 ("[T]he tendency suggests special reason for courts
to consider suspect any legislation that concentrates the costs of exemplary behavior on
subgroups, and away from the government.").
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the political unwillingness of
for their NSLs implies something about
258
elected parties to support this scheme.
By masking the gathering of information with nondisclosure

requirements that prevent banks from notifying customers that their
records have been requested, the government has largely evaded the
heightened scrutiny that courts apply to state action. 2 59 It is possible
that a strategic move to privatize information collection in order to
avoid judicial inference of constitutional obligations would be
ineffective because the courts could easily look beyond the nominally
private actor to discern the underlying state actor. 260 However, this
veneer of private action can be quite effective since courts are, in
practice, often reluctant to reclassify private actors as essentially
261
public.
Nonetheless, judicial control is particularly essential in the financial
privacy context because the public is ill-equipped to effectively monitor
government activity. 262 Courts are the only entities informed of FISA
requests and NSLs, and banks bring challenges in only the minority of
cases. Hence, judicial remedies must supplement the political processes
258. See supra Part II.C (discussing Congress's reluctance to grant these agencies powers to
aid in domestic spying).
259. Stone, supra note 250, at 1483 ("[I]f the courts find state action, some constitutional
standards of conduct become obligatory . . . [and] the courts, having a constitutional basis for
their review, are likely to exercise more scrutiny."); see, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (holding that a municipality has no immunity from liability under the Civil
Rights Act flowing from its constitutional violations and may not assert the good faith of its
officers as a defense to such liability).
260. For example, in § 1983 actions, private actors sometimes engage in state action when
they act in concert with government officials. E.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988)
(holding that a private physician who treated prison inmates in a state facility was engaging in
state action); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 1 (1987) (holding that a creditor
invoking the state's judgment-enforcement mechanism may be considered a state actor).
261. For example, the Supreme Court refused to find state action in the case of a "private"
school that almost solely provided specialized teaching services under a government contract.
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-44 (1982). The Court failed to find that school
officials were acting under color of state law. Id. Consequently, the Court denied the teachers' §
1983 civil rights claims. Id. at 836.
262. Stone, supra note 250, at 1469 ("Because monitoring and controlling by political process
thus have their own limitations, at some point it makes sense to shift toward judicially imposed
liabilities."). However, the Supreme Court has previously considered the constitutionality of the
record maintenance and reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act and declined to find
violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. E.g., Cal. Bankers Ass'n v.
Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that record-keeping requirements imposed by Secretary's
regulations did not deprive banks of due process by imposing unreasonable burdens upon them;
that the mere maintenance of records by the banks under compulsion of the regulations does not
constitute seizure; and that the association's claim that record-keeping requirements violated its
members' First Amendment rights were premature where the government had not sought
disclosure of the association's membership and contributors).
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that generally serve as a check on state actors. The Supreme Court
previously considered the claim that "when a bank makes and keeps
records under compulsion of the Secretary's regulations it acts as a
Government agent and thereby engages in a seizure of its customer's
records." 263 However, in that case, determining the constitutionality of
the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, the Court held that because the banks were
merely maintaining records and disclosing transactions to the
when faced with a subpoena, there was no illegal search or
government
26 4
seizure.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND OBLIGATIONS TO CHALLENGE LAW
ENFORCEMENT INQUIRIES

The obligations of banks to their customers-whether mandated by
statute or invited by contract-prevent banks from exercising full
discretion in actions implicating customer privacy. Although banks
must respect the authority of law enforcement agencies, they should
also act in accordance with the reasonable expectations of their
customers rather than merely abiding by the most lenient reading of the
contracts of adhesion they draft. While notions of confidentiality
generally inform the bank-customer relationship, how a bank should act
when called on to divulge customer information in a particular instance
depends on the type of request, the nature of the relationship, and the
jurisdiction.
As discussed above, neither the FISA nor the NSL statute, in giving
banks the power to object to law enforcement inquiries, require the
exercise of this newly granted authority. 2 65 However, customers expect
26 6
that banks will guard their information and protect their privacy.
This expectation is an essential part of the bank-customer relationship
as encouraged by bank statements, understood by both customers and
courts, and embodied in the privacy agreements that banks draft for
263. Cal. Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 22.
264. Id. at 54 ("That the bank in making the records required by the Secretary acts under the
compulsion of the regulation is clear, but it is equally clear that in doing so it neither searches nor
seizes records in which the depositor has a Fourth Amendment right.").
265. However, the FISA and NSL contexts are unique from other forms of government
requests for records, such as IRS subpoenas. As courts have noted, the statutory scheme
governing IRS subpoenas, by contrast, do not contain any "legally recognized privilege entitling
the bank to withhold such records on behalf of its depositor." Hence, in the case of an IRS
subpoena, "[t]he bank must cooperate with the summons even in the absence of a court order."
Jacobsen v. Citizens State Bank, 587 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex. App. 1979) (citing United States v.
Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1973) (discussing IRC § 7602 (2007)).
266. See supra Part IH.C.l.a (discussing the duty of confidentiality recognized in the bankcustomer relationship at common law).
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their customers to sign. 2 67 While providing a general guarantee of
privacy, these agreements contain exceptions allowing the bank to
disclose customer records in response to law enforcement inquiries.
Courts have typically construed these exceptions narrowly but granted
great deference to law8 enforcement in allowing banks to release
26
customer information.
However, allowing banks to disclose customer information whenever
permitted by the plain language of the bank-customer agreements does
not account for the fact that these agreements are contracts of adhesion.
Because the agreements were drafted en masse by the financial
institution and presented to the adherent on non-negotiable terms, they
do not necessarily reflect the intent or even the assent of the
customer. 26 9 Given the circumstances surrounding their origin, the
precise language of bank-customer agreements should not be entitled to
270
deference unless it conforms to democratically-determined standards,
namely the respect for financial privacy reflected by congressional
enactments such as the RFPA, GLBA and, more recently, the
Reauthorized Patriot Act with its new focus on the importance of preenforcement.
A. Type of Law Enforcement Inquiry
Bank-customer agreements uniformly permit banks to disclose
customer information under compulsion by law. 27 1 Courts have
generally considered subpoenas to be compulsion, valuing bank
compliance with law enforcement over customer confidentiality. 27 2 In
other contexts, courts tend to be deferential to subpoenas when ruling
on a motion to quash.2 73 However, this Part will argue that the unique
267. See supra Part Ili.C.2 (discussing explicit terms in bank privacy policies and the
fiduciary duties recognized in the bank-customer relationship).
268. See supra notes 174-76 (discussing case law involving breaches of customer privacy by

banks).
269. Slawson, supra note 225, at 544.
270. Symons, supra note 98, at 244.
271. Privacy Policy Disclosure, Iowa State Bank & Trust Company (Sept. 2006), availableat
http://www.isbt.comprivacy.php; The Jackson State Bank & Trust Policy On Customer
Confidentiality and Privacy of Information, availableat http://www.jacksonstatebank.com
custserv/privacy.cfm; Bank of America Privacy Policy for Consumers 2007, available at
http://www.bankofamerica.corlprivacy/index.cfm?template=privacysecur_cnsmr.
272. E.g., White v. Regions Bank, 729 So. 2d 856, 858 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (noting that
banks cannot disclose customer information without the customer's consent, unless through
compulsion by law).
273. E.g., Rush v. Maine Sav. Bank, 387 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Me. 1978) ("[T]here is no implied
contractual duty on the part of a mortgagee-bank to delay compliance with an I.R.S. summons, at
least when the summons requests ordinary information.").
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circumstances surrounding FISA requests for records and NSLs warrant
greater judicial scrutiny. FISA section 215 requests lack the ex ante and
ex post procedural safeguard of warrants. NSLs lack even the minimal
safeguards that the FISA process mandates for section 215 requests
274
because the agency need not seek judicial approval prior to issuance.
1. FISA Section 215 Requests
a. FISA Section 215 Requests Lack the Ex Ante Procedural Safeguard
of Warrants
Upon first examination, effectuating a request for documents under
section 215 looks similar to obtaining a search warrant because both
require judicial approval. 27 5 However, a closer look at the FISA request
process reveals that the judicial role should be regarded as more of a
ministerial nod of approval than a critical eye. Although applications
for FISA "warrants" are reviewed by specially selected federal judges,
these judges are given only minimal criteria on which to evaluate the
appropriateness of the applications. 276 Rather than the showing of
probable cause typically required to obtain a search warrant, the
applicant need only show that the records are sought for a foreign
2 77
intelligence, clandestine, or international terrorism investigation.
The ACLU has argued that "[a]s a result of the changes effected by the
Patriot Act, the FBI is now authorized to use section 215 even against
people who are known to be altogether unconnected to criminal activity
2 78
or espionage."
Furthermore, the agency is not required to show any special need for
secrecy when requesting a clandestine search. 27 9 Although a court
order is technically required under FISA, the judge has limited
280
opportunity to engage in meaningful review of the agency's decision.
These emaciated judicial protections are coupled with greater flexibility

274. Rosen, supra note 39 ("National security letters are especially susceptible to abuse
because they're not subject to independent review by a judge or magistrate and because the
recipients are forbidden to discuss them.").
275. See supra Part II.B (explaining the process for acquiring NSLs).
276. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 533.
277. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 6-7, Muslim Comty. Ass'n of Ann
Arbour v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 03-CV-72913-DT),
available at http:// fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/mcaa2ash73003cmp.pdf
(noting former Attorney General John Ashcroft's testimony that the "reason to believe that the
target is an agent of a foreign power" standard may be said to be "lower than probable cause").

278. Id. at 6.
279. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 544.
280. Id. at 533.
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in investigative procedures than is typically permitted in conventional
criminal investigations.
Perhaps most notably, FISA authorizes
clandestine search tactics that prevent the suspect from being
notified. 28 1 Even if the suspect is eventually prosecuted, the defense
attorney is not usually permitted to review the associated surveillance
documents. 282 In addition, FISA searches may be authorized for
broader timelines with less judicial supervision than in conventional

investigations.

283

There are also fewer ex post safeguards following the search or
surveillance than in a conventional investigation. Judicial review at the
completion of the surveillance action is merely optional. 2 84 Those
subjected to clandestine searches may never be notified unless they are
eventually prosecuted, making it effectively impossible to obtain
remedies for unwarranted intrusions into privacy even though the
Patriot Act provides for a civil damages scheme. 2 85
As one
commentator concluded: "In all of these respects, the FISA regime
offers far less accountability and thus a greatly enhanced risk of
286
abuse."
Since the specific reports of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court ("FISC" or "FISA Court") regarding individual applications are
not publicly released, it is difficult to assess how closely the
applications are reviewed. While the aggregate numbers indicate that
the court has been playing a more active role since the passage of the
2001 Patriot Act, over ninety-nine percent of applications are

281. Michael J. Bulzomi, Foreign Intelligence Surveillence Act, 72 LAW ENFORCEMENT
BULL. 6, 30 (June 2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publicationslleb/2003/juneO3leb.pdf
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (2000)) ("Delayed notice, or sneak-and-peek warrants, are now
permissible where the court finds reasonable cause to believe that immediate notification of the
execution of the warrant would have an adverse result.").
282. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 544.
283. Id. at 534.
284. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(3) ("At or before the end of the period of time for which
electronic surveillance is approved by an order or an extension, the judge may assess compliance
with the minimization procedures by reviewing the circumstances under which information
concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.")
285. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2520(g), 2707(g) (West Supp. 2007) (imposing civil liability on
investigative or law enforcement officers or entities of the government for any willful use or
unauthorized disclosure of information); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2712(a) (West Supp. 2007) (creating a
cause of action against the United States for victims of willful violations of the FISA
requirements relating to surveillance or physical searches). But see Schulhofer, supra note 84, at
542-43 ("But the civil remedy is virtually meaningless because those individuals, unless
subsequently prosecuted, can virtually never learn that they had been under surveillance.").
286. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 538.
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approved.2 87
Before 2001, the FISA Court received about 750
applications per year and had never rejected a single one. 28 8 In 2003,
the FISA Court reviewed 1724 applications and denied only four.
These numbers have led notable civil liberties groups to refer to the
FISA Court as a rubber stamp. 289 Before 9/11, the FBI was required to
certify that the records were sought for a foreign intelligence purpose
and that "specific facts" confirmed that the records pertained to the
agent of a foreign power.290 In the 2001 Patriot Act, both of these
requirements were eliminated and replaced by a good-faith standard. 29 1
Furthermore, the FISA Court has a very limited and deferential standard
of review and lacks statutory authority to examine or reject the FBI's
certification that the records are sought for an investigation related to
292
foreign intelligence or terrorism.
b. FISA Section 215 Requests Lack the Ex Post Procedural Safeguards
of Subpoenas
During the discovery phase of conventional civil litigation, private
litigants may issue subpoenas without prior judicial approval.2 9 3 Unlike
bank customers whose records are subpoenaed by FISA requests,
recipients of conventional civil subpoenas in private litigation are
notified of the document production request and have an opportunity to
294
challenge it in court by filing a motion to quash the subpoena.
Hence, "the recipient of a subpoena gets a procedural option not
available to the target of a search: she can challenge the subpoena prior
to releasing the information. "295 The recipient may file a motion to
quash and receive a hearing in front of a judge. 296 Although the
requirements for upholding a subpoena are minimal, "judicial oversight,
even in this highly diluted form, does act as a check on unrestricted
287. EPIC, FISA Orders 1979-2006, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisastats.html
(last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
288. Id.
289. Timothy Edgar & Witold Walczak, We Can Be Both Safe & Free: How the PATRIOT
Act Threatens Civil Liberties, 76 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 21, 22 (2005) ("[T]he PATRIOT Act in some
cases eliminates judicial review entirely, through national security letters for instance, and in
many instances changes the review standard to make judges little more than rubber stamps.").
290. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 548-49.
291. Id. at 549 ("It is no longer necessary for the FBI to have factual support for its decision to
investigate, and it is not even necessary for agents to believe that the targeted person is a
suspected offender or a foreign agent.").
292. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(c)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3).
294. Id. at 45(c)(3)(A).
295. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 545.

296. Id.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

official snooping, and it provides the subpoena recipient an important
guarantee of accountability." 2 97 Furthermore, judicial oversight may be
particularly influential in the arena of financial privacy, because courts
are reluctant to compel the discovery of personal financial records.
Courts typically decline to uphold subpoenas for financial information
in civil suits, failing to find such inquiries relevant under normal
29 8
circumstances.
By contrast, in the case of a FISA request, the customer is never
299
notified of the subpoena and hence has no ability to contest it.
Unless banks challenge these subpoenas, there is no judicial inquiry into
the basis of the investigation and the necessity of the intrusion into the
customer's privacy. 30 0 This is particularly disturbing because judicial
review has been called "the most common and important civil liberties
30
protection." '
2. National Security Letters Lack Even the Procedural Protections of
FISA Requests
The NSL process lacks even the minimal judicial safeguards
mandated by the formalistic FISA request procedure. To issue an NSL,
30 2
the agency need not seek judicial approval prior to enforcement.
Courts only enter the process if the recipient of the letter petitions to
have the letter modified or set aside. 30 3 Since customers are not the
recipients of the letters and do not receive notice, they rely on banks to
involve courts when necessary. Indeed, banks serve as the gatekeepers
to judicial review of NSLs.
Banks should take it upon themselves to challenge NSLs or at least to
review the letters in order to make a reasoned determination as to
whether a challenge may be necessary. While a subpoena may be
considered compulsion of law and many bank agreements explicitly
mention subpoenas as an exception to nondisclosure requirements, this
297. Id.
298. Jack W. Campbell IV, Revoking the "Fishing License": Recent Decisions Place
UnwarrantedRestrictions on Administrative Agencies' Power to Subpoena Personal Financial
Records, 49 VAND. L. REV. 395, 432 (1996); e.g., Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 479 (10th
Cir. 1974) ("Ordinarily courts do not inquire into the financial responsibility of litigants. We
generally eschew the question whether litigants are rich or poor."). But see FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a)
(allowing compulsion of financial records to enforce a judgment).
299. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 554.
300. Id. (stating that bank inaction also eliminates "virtually any possibility for public

criticism").
301. Edgar & Walczak, supra note 289, at 22.
302. Rosen, supra note 39.
303. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511 (West Supp. 2007).
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exception should not be interpreted to include NSLs. 304 Furthermore,
most federal cases holding that a depositor has no proprietary interest in
his bank records, and consequently no standing to challenge the
solicitation of his records by law enforcement authorities under the
Fourth Amendment, involve customers resisting formal subpoenas or
summons authorized by administrative or judicial bodies, not merely
informal requests. 30 5 Non-mandatory NSLs are not backed by a

comparable force of law-a judicially decreed order-unless they are
challenged and subsequently upheld in court. 3 06 Hence, permissive
compliance with NSLs does not fall within the strict confines of the "as
compelled by law" language adopted by many banks in their privacy
agreements. 30 7 Furthermore, blind acquiescence to the whims of law
enforcement does not meld with case law in most states, which has
limited the disclosure of customer records to authorities to subpoenas,
summons, and other formal processes. 30 8 In addition, releasing records
without examining the nature of the request or the requesting authority
conflicts with banks' promises to respect customer privacy and their
self-assigned duty of confidentiality. 30 9 This is particularly true when
banks take on heightened obligations to their customers by serving in
3 10
more intimate roles.

304. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802(e)(8) (2000 & West Supp. 2007).
305. E.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894) (discussing the
necessity for citizens to yield to summonses from the Interstate Commerce Commission); United
States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1212-13 (8th Cir. 1969) (determining bank and Western Union
records to be admissible evidence, due to customers' lack of ownership); Harris v. United States,
413 F.2d 316, 317-18 (9th Cir. 1969) (explaining that the bank owned microfilms it made of
checks, leaving no rights to the customer); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617, 618 (10th
Cir. 1968) (determining that bank records were solely the property of the bank). But see Vera
Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in PersonalInformation, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 443 (2003) (explaining that individuals should have options to "keep
their personal information private , or conversely, sell, pledge, or license it").
306. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(c) (West Supp. 2007).
307. Winer, supra note 62.
308. See supra Part III.C.2.b (discussing when banks must disclose customer information).
309. In analogous contexts, banks have conditioned their deference to law enforcement
authorities on the presence of a subpoena. For example, in holding that a bank must comply with
a subpoena and its non-disclosure requirement despite its promulgated privacy policy, the
Supreme Court of Kansas accorded considerable weight to the fact that the law enforcement
request was a subpoena. State ex. rel. Brant v. Bank of Am. 31 P.3d 952, 959 (Kan. 2001).
In that case, the Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued the subpoena,
but judicial intervention was required for its enforcement: "The Commissioner's subpoena power
is not self-executing. There is an avenue open to challenge the Commissioner's alleged abuse of
his investigative powers." Id.
310. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(f) (2000) ("The term 'mutual savings bank' means a bank without
capital stock transacting a savings bank business, the net earnings of which inure wholly to the
benefit of its depositors after payment of obligations for any advances by its organizers."); Pigg v.
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Courts should approach bank compliance with non-mandatory NSLs
with the same skepticism they have toward voluntary disclosure in
analogous contexts. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
held that a bank cannot voluntarily disclose customer information to
government authorities. 31 1 In finding that banks could not grant the IRS
informal access to bank records, the court determined that voluntary
cooperation does not exempt banks from the requirements of the
RFPA.3 12 Similarly, the California courts rejected the voluntary nature
of the bank's disclosure as a defense to allegations of Fourth
Amendment violations, reasoning that the customer "has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the bank statements, [and] the voluntary
relinquishment of such records by the bank at the request of the police
3 13
does not constitute a valid consent."
Before the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1987, the FBI could
only issue such non-mandatory letters. 3 14 A substantial number of
financial institutions complied voluntarily. 3 15 However, as FBI officials
testified to a House Committee that proposed the 1987 amendment, "in
certain significant instances, financial institutions have declined to grant
the FBI access to financial records in response to requests under §
1114(a) . . . particularly in States which have State constitutional
3 16
privacy protection provisions or State banking privacy laws."
Financial institutions that did not comply with the letters claimed that
"[s]tate law prohibit[ed] them from granting access and the RFPA, since
it permits but does not mandate such access, does not override State
law;" they feared that "cooperation might expose them to liability to the

Robertson, 549 S.W.2d 597, 600-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (implying a confidential relationship
where bank employees were called upon to give advice to customers).
311. Neece v. IRS, 922 F.2d 573, 577-78 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The provisions of the RFPA
provide an elaborate mechanism to protect a taxpayer's privacy rights in records kept by third
parties. We must protect this mechanism.").
312. Id. at 578 ("We, therefore, hold that a financial institution and a Government authority..
otherwise bound by the procedural requirements of the RFPA ... are not exempted . .. from
those procedural requirements merely because the financial institution voluntarily chooses to
allow the IRS ...to examine financial records pertaining to a taxpayer.").
313. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590, 594 (Cal. 1975).
314. H.R. REP. No. 99-690(I), sec. 403, at 14-15 (1986), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5327,
5340-41.
315. Palmer & Palmer, supra note 107, at 211.
316. H.R. REP. No. 99-690(I), sec. 403, at 15. The House committee did not speak directly to
the potential for liability under the original section 1114(a) but noted that the addition of section
404 would solve this noncompliance problem: "[B]y providing for mandatory FBI access to a
customer's or entity's financial records for counterintelligence purposes in certain circumstances,
[section 404] preempts State law to the contrary which otherwise would not permit such access."
Id. at 16.
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customer to whose records the FBI sought access." 3 17 The fact that
Congress felt the need to amend the statute to make compliance
mandatory in order to ensure that banks would not be liable for
disclosing records in response to NSLs indicates that noncompulsory
letters do not enjoy absolute priority over state privacy protections.
By passing the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1987, Congress
clearly stated that mandatory NSLs supersede state privacy protections
without addressing whether compulsory letters similarly take
precedence over contractual obligations.
However, by negative
implication and from Congress's felt need to amend the statute to
require compliance, it appears that Congress was not willing to claim
that non-compulsory letters were entitled to the unwavering deference
of banks.
Given the tenuous authority and minimal procedural
safeguards of non-compulsory NSLs, banks should not prioritize
31 8
compliance over state constitutional provisions and statutory regimes
or self-generated promises of privacy. Hence, banks should be required
to institute a policy of challenging non-mandatory NSLs or at least
engaging in critical case-by-case review to determine whether NSLs
should be challenged.
B. When Do DepositorsHave a Right Against Banks Where Banks Fail
to Exercise Their Full Rights Against the Government?
As demonstrated above, the FISA request process appears to involve
less judicial oversight in practice than the text of section 215 might
suggest. The revised FISA statute does not indicate upon what grounds
a request will be struck down if challenged. Reasoning by analogy to
the subpoena context, FISA requests will presumably be denied upon
review when they fail to meet the minimal standard of showing that the
records are sought for a foreign intelligence investigation.3 1 9 Although
courts have almost unanimously held that subpoenas are considered

317. Id. at 15-16. Note that Congress remained cautious of giving the FBI too much
discretion in extending this grant of authority to issue NSLs with mandatory compliance. For
example, the House Committee "carefully considered whether to grant the FBI mandatory access
to financial records for foreign counterintelligence purposes upon a determination that there are
specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual is or may be a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power" but rejected the "or may be" language as "provid[ing] an
unwarranted degree of latitude." Id. at 17.
318. See supra Part III.B (detailing relevant statutory schemes).
319. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 6-7, Muslim Comty. Ass'n of Ann
Arbour v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 03-CV-72913-DT), available
at http:// fli.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/mcaa2ash73003cmp.pdf (Testimony
of former Attorney General John Ashcroft).
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compulsion by law, 320 and bank-customer privacy agreements typically
allow for disclosure under such circumstances, 32 1 FISA requests are
distinct from traditional subpoenas because customers are not notified
and cannot object.
Furthermore, banks are bound not merely by the bare text of these
privacy agreements, but also by their construction as contracts of
adhesion. 322 Because provisions enumerating the circumstances under
which a bank may disclose customer information are neither negotiable
nor salient, there is little reason to believe that customers actually
understand or accept these terms. 323 These contracts merit greater
deference when they conform to publicly determined standards. 324 In
this case, the Reauthorized Patriot Act evinces that Congress espouses a
policy permitting banks to challenge FISA requests. 325 Given this
development, courts should not be strong-armed by banks unilaterally
limiting their obligations to customers through contracts of adhesion.
Rather, courts should make their own determination as to whether the
contracts are in line with congressional intent before honoring them.
In considering the customer expectations of privacy as reflected in
the guiding principles behind legislative acts like the RFPA, judicial
decisions similar to Brex and Peterson, and the very privacy policies
distributed by banks themselves, a court may well conclude that banks
should not yield to a FISA request without due consideration of the
nature and basis of the request. This is even more apparent in the case
of an NSL, which is not subjected to pre-enforcement judicial review
and hence should not be considered compulsion by law. 3 26 Finally,
327
non-mandatory NSLs are by definition not compulsory in nature.
When the issuing agency requests records on an admittedly optional
basis, courts should be reluctant to hold that banks may comply pro

320. See supra Part III.C.2.b (explaining the necessary release of customer information under
compulsion by law).
321. See supra Part Il.C.3.c (discussing the vulnerabilities of adhesion contracts).
322. Rakoff, supra note 215, at 1176-80; see generally supra Part IlI.C.3 (examining bank

contracts as contracts of adhesion).
323.
324.
325.
2007).
326.
327.

Korobkin, supra note 222, at 1233.
Slawson, supra note 225, at 536.
50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(a) (West Supp.
See supra Part II.B (explaining how to obtain an NSL).
See supra Part H.C (discussing components of non-mandatory NSLs).

2007]

forma despite
3 28
customers.

Contracting for Financial Privacy
the

in

promises

their

relationships

with

their

C. Existing Challenges to Law Enforcement Inquiriesfor Financial
Records
All of the federal privacy-promoting statutes contain exceptions that
allow customer records to be disclosed without customer notice when
the financial institution is served with formal process of law. 329 These
330
exceptions are written narrowly and interpreted as such by the courts.
Although courts have not typically imposed liability on banks for
disclosing records in response to a subpoena, they have sometimes

imposed penalties

on banks

for complying with less formal

processes. 33 1

These cases typically surface because bank customers
have standing under the RFPA when banks divulge information despite
the failure of the requesting authority to comply with the Act's
procedural requirements. 332 For example, the instance of a bank
responding to an oral request by law enforcement officials was held to
violate the RFPA because the bank was not permitted to disclose
information except in the case of customer authorization, subpoena,
warrant, or formal written request. 3 33 In investigations concerning
national security, however, customers cannot be notified that their

328. E.g., Neece v. IRS, 922 F.2d 573, 577-78 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The provisions of the RFPA
provide an elaborate mechanism to protect a taxpayer's privacy rights in records kept by third
parties. We must protect this mechanism.").
329. E.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802(e)(8) (2000 & West Supp. 2007) (providing exceptions under
which disclosure of nonpublic personal information is allowed).
330. See supra Part III.B (examing the relevant statutory schemes); John H. Derrick, Rights
and Remedies of FinancialInstitution Customer in Relation to Subpoena Duces Tecum Exception
to GeneralProhibitionsof State Right to FinancialPrivacy Statute, 43 A.L.R. 4th 1157, 1158-59
(1986) ("In recognition of the fact that there are instances in which the state has a legitimate
interest in obtaining such customer records, the [federal] statutes uniformly provide for an
exception allowing disclosure without the consent of the customer under the authority of a
subpoena duces tecum issued to the financial institution.").
331. E.g., Neece, 922 F.2d at 576 (holding that a financial institution that is bound by the
RFPA requires disclosure because it chooses to voluntarily allow the IRS to examine the financial
records of one of its customers).
332. 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a) (2000) ("Within ten days of service or within fourteen days of
mailing of a subpena [sic], summons, or formal written request, a customer may file a motion to
quash an administrative summons or judicial subpena [sic], or an application to enjoin a
Government authority from obtaining financial records pursuant to a formal written request, with
copies served upon the Government authority.").
333. Anderson v. La Junta State Bank, 115 F.3d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing the narrow
exceptions to 12 U.S.C. § 3402); see also Neece, 922 F.2d at 575 ("12 U.S.C. § 3402 of the
RFPA specifies the only means by which federal agencies can obtain an individual's records in
the possession of third-party record keepers such as financial institutions.").

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

records have been subpoenaed. Hence, they must rely on banks to
vindicate their rights.
Customers have standing to object when banks disclose records of
their own volition, without formal process by the requesting
authority. 334 In less extreme cases, customers may also challenge
disclosures that are not closely tailored to the issued subpoena. For
example, a Maryland state court held that a customer could seek judicial

relief from unauthorized disclosure of his financial records that were
3 35
produced in a different time and place than specified in the subpoena.
Banks also have standing to bring a motion to quash a subpoena that
336
directs them to release customer records.
While customers do not have standing under the RFPA or other
federal statutes to move for suppression of evidence obtained from
unauthorized or unlawful disclosures, 3 37 they may have standing under
state statutes. Courts in Colorado have reasoned that because bank
customers maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
financial records, they had standing under the state Constitution to
challenge a subpoena issued to the bank. 3 38 Courts in New Hampshire
granted bank customers litigating for breach of privacy not only
standing but also remedies, holding that suppression of records is an
appropriate remedy when those records are obtained in violation of a
state financial privacy statute. 3 39 State courts in Utah and Arizona have

334. Neece, 922 F.2d at 577-78. In response to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, customers
complained that the recordkeeping requirements "undercut a depositor's right to effectively
challenge a third-party summons." Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 51 (1974). The
United States Supreme Court held that this scheme "works no injury on his bank" but withheld
judgment on whether compulsion by subpoena of these records would give rise to depositor
claims. Id. at 51.
335. Bond v. Slavin, 851 A.2d 598, 608 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (holding that subpoenaed
records should not have been delivered to the plaintiff's wife, instead of the court, without a
hearing because "[tihe custodian cannot-without obtaining the permission of the person(s)
whose financial records have been subpoenaed-produce those records at a different place on a
different date"). While reaffirming that banks are compelled to release the requested records
when presented with formal process, these courts have held that the disclosure is only permissible
if it precisely conforms to the request.
336. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 827 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Okla. 1992).
337. E.g., In re Special Investigation No. 242, 452 A.2d 1319, 1322 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1982) (holding that the customer did not have standing to challenge a subpoena that was not
directed at him, but rather at the bank to which he had voluntarily disclosed infomation).
338. Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Colo. 1980) (citing COLO. CONST. art. H, §
7).
339. See State v. Sheedy, 474 A.2d 1042, 1043 (N.H. 1984) ("[T]he suppression of any
evidence obtained in violation of the Privacy Act is an appropriate remedy to vindicate the
purpose behind the legislature's passage of the Privacy Act."); see also State v. Flynn, 464 A.2d
268, 274 (N.H. 1983) ("Therefore, we hold that the defendant has standing to challenge any
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heard customer challenges and similarly granted motions to suppress
financial records obtained through unlawful subpoenas on state
constitutional grounds. 340 In Illinois, a bank customer was granted
standing to challenge a subpoena of her financial records because she
had a right of privacy in her financial records under the Illinois
Constitution. 34 1 The Illinois court found that the most appropriate
means of balancing the personal interest in privacy against the public
interest in effective investigations was to use the validity of the
34 2
subpoena as the test.
The newly created ability of banks to raise objections to FISA
343
requests is drafted in the Reauthorized Patriot Act as a privilege.
However, there is precedent for the argument that this privilege may
become a duty under certain circumstances. 3 44 For example, a person
seeking to compel inspection or production of records from the Federal
Reserve Bank must file a written request with the Bank's general
counsel before enforcing a subpoena. 34 5 More generally, courts in
many jurisdictions have agreed that banks have standing to challenge

evidence obtained directly or indirectly from a violation of his privacy rights ....[I]nformation
wrongly obtained from the defendant's accounts ... may be suppressed.").
340. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1991) ("Exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14.") (quoting State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990)); see also State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 524 (Ariz.
1984) (holding the same based on a parallel provision in the Arizona state constitution).
341. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of
privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means."); People
v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88-89 (I11.
App. Ct. 1983) ("In reliance upon this express proscription
against invasion of privacy in Illinois and influenced by the Commentary which suggests that this
protection should be broadly applied, we are led to conclude that the Illinois State Constitution
offers protection for the reasonable expectation of privacy which our citizens have in their bank
records."); see also 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/48.1 (2006) (providing state statutory right to privacy
and notice).
342. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d at 90 (holding that although plaintiff's right to privacy as
guaranteed by the state constitution gave her standing to challenge the subpoena, the validity of
the subpoena outweighed her privacy interests); see also Rycroft v. Gaddy, 314 S.E.2d 39, 42, 44
(S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a bank did not need to "look beyond the face of a valid
subpoena" before complying by disclosing a customer's records).
343. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007) ("A person receiving a production
order may challenge the legality of that order by filing a petition with the pool established by
section 1803(e)(1) of this title.").
344. See generally Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Flagship Auto Ctr., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9468, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 13, 2005), amended by 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67876 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 21, 2006) (denying defendant's motion to compel documents from the Federal Reserve
Bank).
345. Id. at 17 (finding that the written request must show that the need for confidential
information outweighs the need to maintain confidentiality).
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subpoenas on behalf of their customers. 34 6 These challenges to law
enforcement inquiries in other contexts have set the stage for banks to
use their newfound power to respect financial privacy in the face of
national security investigations.
Although some courts have resisted banks who argued that their
privacy policies prohibited them from abiding by subpoenas, these
challenges have typically been struck down in cases where the privacy
policies exempted the exact conduct being litigated.3 47 In one such
case, Bank of America had posted a privacy policy on its website
indicating: "If we receive a subpoena or similar legal process
demanding release of any information about you, we will generally
attempt to notify you (unless we believe we are prohibited from doing
so). Except as required by law ... we do not share information with
other parties, including government agencies." 348 Bank of America
then received a subpoena requesting the production of customer records
and prohibiting disclosure of the request to any third party. 349 The bank
challenged the subpoena on the grounds that compliance would violate
customers' Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 3 50 However, the
Kansas state court held that "the right to privacy statement ...does not
create a privacy expectation in situations such as this where the agency
is empowered to conduct an investigation in private." 351 The court
classified the subpoena as "fall[ing] into the category excepted by Bank
of America's recognition that it may be prohibited from notifying
customers of the subpoena." 352 Hence, the court was not promulgating
a blanket rule that privacy agreements could not be used to expand
privacy protections, but rather implied that the privacy agreement in
question as written did not determinatively expand confidentiality into

346. See Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 827 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Okla. 1992)
(allowing a bank to bring suit for an injunction to enjoin the Oklahoma Tax Commission's
administrative process for the inspection of financial records).
347. E.g., Brant v. Bank of Am., 31 P.3d 952, 954 (Kan. 2001) (holding that despite the
bank's privacy policy, the state securities commisioner, under his power to conduct private
investigations, could prohibit the bank from disclosing to customers that a subpoena had been
issued).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 960. But see Brant, 31 P.3d at 962 (Knudson, J., dissenting) ("Although I concede
a bank customer in Kansas has no constitutional expectation of privacy in his or her bank records,
most customers surely believe their banker will notify them if some government agency is
snooping around in their records and accounts. I do not believe the legislature intended to negate
that entirely rational and understandable expectation by the banking public.").
352. Id. at 959.
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the circumstances of the case. 353 Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine held that when presented with a formal request for records by
the IRS, a bank was not obliged to delay compliance. 354 However, this
holding was based not only on concerns about burdening the bank but
also on the paucity of clear contractual language dictating how the bank
3 55
should act in face of a subpoena.
Generally, the person whose records are compelled by the subpoena
is also the direct recipient of the subpoena and has an opportunity to
challenge it by filing a motion to quash.35 6 However, in the case of a
bank subpoena sealed with a nondisclosure requirement, the subject of
the subpoena is not in a position to request a judicial hearing by filing a
motion to quash. "[T]herefore, a subpoena does not afford the person
most affected the necessary opportunity to participate in compliance and
insure accountability." 357 Under these circumstances, banks should rise
to the occasion and defend their customers' privacy as Congress has
authorized. Although they may choose to honor this obligation under
the present contractual regime, financial institutions may also exercise
their rights through contractual promises to engage in substantive
review and challenge requests when appropriate.
V. CONTRACTING TO REQUIRE CHALLENGES TO REQUESTS FOR
FINANCIAL RECORDS

Since Congress has given banks the statutory authorization to
challenge FISA requests, customers may contractually obligate banks to
take on this role. The Reauthorized Patriot Act has empowered banks
but only created uncertainty for customers, who have no way to predict
whether a bank would challenge requests for their records and under
what circumstances. 358 The possibility that one's financial records may
be disclosed in response to a government inquiry is more disconcerting
to some customers than others. As one commentator has noted in

353. However, the court does generally come out in favor of allowing private investigations.
Id. at 956 ("A target given notice of every subpoena issued to third parties would be able to
discourage the recipients from complying.") (quoting and relying heavily on SEC v. Jerry T.
O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1984)).
354. Rush v. Maine, 387 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Me. 1978).
355. Id.
356. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A).
357. Schulhofer, supra note 84, at 545.
358. See Steven A. Bibas, A ContractualApproach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 591, 609 (1994) ("[F]lexibility produces uncertainty for private parties. In the hands of the
contracting parties, however, flexibility allows people to control their lives and efficiently tailor
the law to meet their needs.").
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mean"
considering personal valuations of financial privacy, the "golden
359
is "a solution tailored to individual preferences and values."
Perhaps the least controversial version of such a contract would be a
promise on the part of the bank to engage in some internal review or
consultation to determine whether the request is lawfully authorized. If
the bank determines that the FISA request is not lawful because it fails
to meet the requirements of section 215, the bank would then be
required to challenge it: a bank cannot be "compelled" to disclose
information by an unlawful request. 360 While banks cannot be held
liable by statute for disclosing records in response to a subpoena, they
may be held liable on contractual grounds for failing to take the
appropriate procedural 1precautions permitted by the statute and
36
expected by customers.
This final Part will describe the terms that a bank-customer
agreement ensuring such challenges to disclosure might take. Since
contracts that wholly bar reporting information to law enforcement
authorities have been found void against public policy, this Article
suggests that contracts incorporate a procedural hook requiring banks to
challenge. This type of contract should not violate public policy norms
because the Reauthorized Patriot Act authorizes exactly this kind of
challenge to law enforcement inquiries.
A. ContractualTerms Requiring Banks to Challenge Law Enforcement
Inquiries
As discussed in the preceding Part, privacy agreements as currently
drafted may obligate banks to challenge some law enforcement inquiries
in light of duties accrued from statutory protections or the banking
tradition of confidentiality. 362 However, the tenuous nature of these
financial privacy protections provides, at best, questionable assurance of
privacy for customers. 363 In light of the recent procedural nod to
359. Id. at 593 ("Many people fear the loss of their privacy in a computerized 'Naked
Society.' Others, however, are less concerned about the need for privacy and may be unwilling to
sacrifice the benefits generated by the information economy."); see also Jonathan P. Graham,
Note, Privacy, Computers & the Commercial Dissemination of PersonalInformation, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 1395, 1424 (1986-1987) ("[T]he inflexible nature of an across-the-board statutory remedy
might render the remedy inadequate to deal with the fluid nature of the information economy.").
360. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah. 1991).
361. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(e) (West 2003) ("A person who, in good faith, produces tangible
things under an order pursuant to this section shall not be liable to any other person for such
production.").
362. See supra Part H (discussing privacy rights of depositors).
363. See Edgar & Walczak, supra note 289, at 22 (providing statistics which imply that ex
ante judicial review is merely a rubber stamp).
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financial privacy embedded in the Reauthorized Patriot Act, banks and
their customers should be permitted to contract for more meaningful
assurance that requests for financial records by law enforcement
authorities will be challenged. 364 This could be structured as an
absolute promise to challenge all requests, to challenge a particular kind
of request (e.g., NSLs but not FISA requests), or more flexibly, a pledge
to create a policy of internal review that would examine each request to
determine whether a challenge would be appropriate. For example, in
deciding whether to object to an administrative subpoena, institutions
should consider the overarching legitimacy of the request, particularly
whether the issuing agency was authorized to issue the subpoena and
whether the subpoena seeks information protected by federal or state
constitutional or statutory rights. In addition, institutions can analyze the
specifics of the request, such as whether the subpoena was timely and
properly served, whether it described the solicited documents with
enough particularity, and whether the requested production would be
unduly burdensome. 3 65 Because Congress has already proclaimed that
these challenges are not incompatible with law enforcement
investigations, 3 66 financial institutions and their customers should be
able to build this procedural hook into their contracts explicitly.
Because the bank-customer relationship is contractual in origin, the
two parties are free to establish its terms and require the financial
institution to take on more protective or fiduciary-like duties. 367 Courts
have recognized that a bank "may be made subject to any legal
agreement which the depositor and the bank may make concerning it, so
long as it does not injuriously affect the rights of innocent third
parties." 36 8 Accordingly, courts have enforced contracts providing for
confidentiality beyond the default standard of disclosure in other
contexts, even when the contractual provisions conflicted with public
interest. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held

364. See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing modifications of the
original Patriot Act, including a nod to financial privacy).
365. Pamela Davis, What to Do When the Government Calls: Advising Clients on
Government Demands for Personal Information on Customers and Others, Speech at PLI
Conference (June 2004).
366. See generally 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(0 (West Supp. 2007) (explicitly authorizing banks to
bring these challenges).
367. Teeling v. Ind. Nat'l Bank, 436 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) ("[T]he
relationship between a depositor and a bank is contractual in nature, and the parties are generally
free to establish a fiduciary relationship between themselves by agreement.").
368. Sindlinger v. Dep't Fin. Inst., 199 N.E. 715, 723 (Ind. 1936) ("If there is no [bad faith]
connected with the transaction, the character of the deposit, whether general or special, is to be
determined from the contract between the depositor and the bank.").

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 39

that a doctor who entered into a voluntary confidential agreement with
his patient "was not at liberty to breach his obligation even when he felt
it was in the public's best interest to do so. ' ' 369 The court found the
doctor's "cho[ice] to limit his ability to share information" dispositive
in overriding the norms of disclosure. 370 In holding the doctor liable for
breach of confidentiality, the court noted the public policy favoring "the
free-flow of information in a truth-finding process" but found 37
that
an
1
adhered party cannot voluntarily testify to protected information.
The banking context is particularly ripe for such contracting for
heightened privacy protection because legislation foreshadows and
sanctions this development.
The GLBA requires that financial
institutions "provide a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the
institution's privacy policies" to customers. 372
In drafting this
requirement, Congress clearly assumed that different institutions would
provide varying levels of protections; if only the baseline protections
mandated by the GLBA and RFPA were permissible, then no
institutional notice would be necessary.
Along with promoting
flexibility in contracts and variety in privacy policies, the GLBA
champions individual customers determining the level of disclosure
they are willing to permit. For example, the GLBA allows customers to
opt out of the sharing of their information with unaffiliated third parties
by requiring banks to provide specific notice of any proposed
37 3
disclosures and a reasonable period of time for the opt-out to occur.
Once a customer opts out, "a financial institution must honor that optout direction as soon as is reasonably practicable after the opt-out is
received.- 374 This principle of self-determination-allowing customers
to take charge of the flow of their personal information and to play a
role in the decisions governing the dissemination of their records among

369. Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 2002).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 497. But see McGrane v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 822 F. Supp. 1044, 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (demonstrating that in other contexts, such as employee trade secret agreements,
"[c]ourts are increasingly reluctant to enforce secrecy arrangements where matters of substantial
concern to the public-as distinct from trade secrets or other legitimately confidential
information-may be allowed").
372. 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2002 & West Supp. 2007).
373. F.T.C., In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/glbshort.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2007); see also
Swire, supra note 70, at 1263 (describing the GLBA as succesful privacy legislation).
374. F.T.C., Division of Financial Practices, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/glboutline.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2007).
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an array of presented options-would translate well into the context of
contracting for pre-enforcement challenges.
B. Public Policy
In general, contracts can impose heightened obligations on banks:
"The relationship between a depositor and a bank is contractual in
nature, and the parties are generally free to establish a fiduciary
relationship between themselves by agreement." 37 5 Article 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "the Code") elaborates the
contractual principles controlling the bank-customer relationship, which
is governed by the provisions of the written agreement along with the
reasonable expectations described in the UCC.
In general, the
provisions provided by the Code serve only as a default and can be
varied by agreement. 3 76 The only requirements that cannot be
circumvented by contract are "good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and
care." 3 77 These unalterable principles may serve as guideposts in
determining whether bank-customer agreements obligating the bank to
assume greater confidentiality are valid.
Contracts requiring banks to challenge law enforcement inquiries
before releasing customer information might brush up against public
policy exclusions to contract enforceability. Doctrinally, a contractual
term is deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds if it contradicts
relevant legislation or if a balancing of interests substantially disfavors
its enforcement. 378 In weighing public policy against enforcing a
contract, courts consider "the strength of the policy as manifested in
legislation or judicial decisions," and whether "refusing to enforce the
contract will further the policy or prevent misconduct, especially if
serious, deliberate, or directly linked to the contract. 3 7 9
Agreements categorically preventing banks from disclosing customer
information would probably not be enforceable. Contracts interfering
with law enforcement have generally been held void against public
policy. 380 Courts also hesitate to punish someone for exposing the

375. Teeling v. Ind. Nat'l Bank, 436 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind.Ct. App. 1982).
376. U.C.C. § 1-102 (2005).
377. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2005).
378. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981); Town of Newton v. Rumery,
480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("[A] promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement.").
379. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(3) (1981); RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:2 (4th ed. 1990).
380. 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 234, at 204 (1999) ("Agreements which tend to suppress legal
investigation concerning criminal offenses . . . are illegal as against public policy ...").
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wrongdoing of another. As a result, contracts preventing the disclosure
of information that would reveal the perpetrator of a crime are seldom
enforced. 38 1 Courts have formalized this public policy exception by
making unenforceable those contracts which intend to defraud or
deceive third parties. 382
Some state courts have broadened the
traditional public policy exceptions by holding that contracts that have
the effect of preventing illicit activity from being reported are
38 3
unenforceable even absent the element of intent or knowledge.

These exceptions manifest the reluctance of courts to enforce contracts
that might injure third parties, even if such consequences were not
anticipated. 3 84 Using a consequentialist approach, courts have declined
to hold parties liable for breaching a contract in order to disclose
suspicious activity: "A party bound by contract to silence, but
suspecting that its silence would permit a crime to go undetected, would
be forced to choose between breaching the contract and hoping that an
actual crime is eventually proven, or honoring the contract while a
' 385
possible crime goes unnoticed.
In an analogous context, courts have also voided settlement
agreements that barred the reporting of crimes to relevant law
enforcement agencies on public policy grounds. 3 86 Courts have even
resisted enforcing settlement agreements that do not explicitly conflict
with the letter of the law if they generally prevent the revelation of
suspicious activity to authorities. 387 In refusing to uphold a settlement
agreement that purportedly barred reporting crimes to German
381. See generally 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 577 (1932).

§

1455;

382. E.g., Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1972) ("An
agreement, the [purpose] of which is the commission of a civil wrong against a third person, is
also illegal ....
");
see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1980) ("[I]t is obvious that
agreements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend
them from the standpoint of public policy.").
383. In Lachman, the contract at issue was not entered into with the intent or knowledge of
potential deceit. However, the court cited the more extreme case of Singer, in which a contract
exchanging a promissory note for a promise to conceal a crime was held unenforceable, to stand
for the proposition that the state "has expressed a stronger interest in the punishment of wrongful
behavior than in the strict enforcement of contracts when the two interests collide." Lachman,
457 F.2d at 853.
384. Id.; see also Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Escoe, 64 P.2d 855, 857 (Ok]. 1937) (noting
that to enforce such a contract would be contrary to public policy). See generally Wilshire Oil Co.
v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 1969) (discussing plaintiff s ability to bring suit in an
antitrust case).
385. Lachman, 457 F.2d at 854.
386. Fomby-Denson v. Dep't of Army, 247 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Intro. to ch. 8, topic 1,at 5 (198 1)).
387. Id. at 1375.
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authorities, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that "there is no federal
statute, treaty, or constitutional requirement mandating the referrals to
the German law enforcement authorities." 388 However, the court
applied the general presumption against enforcing contracts preventing
disclosure of crimes in voiding the agreement: "We nonetheless
conclude that the public policy interest at stake, the reporting of
possible crimes to the authorities, is one of the highest order and is
indisputably 'well defined and dominant' in the jurisprudence of
3 89
contract."
However, in considering whether a contract is void as against public
policy, it is important to remember that there are competing policies at
stake. 390 Factors in favor of enforcing a contract despite a potential
conflict with public policy include "(a) the parties' justified
expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were
denied, and (c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the
particular term." 3 9 1 In the case of bank customers, the first two factors
are weighted toward enforcing privacy agreements. As Congress
indicated in passing the RFPA, customers reasonably expect that the
information they are required to convey to banks to participate in
financial transactions will be kept as confidential as is legally
permissible. 392 Furthermore, the forfeiture of financial privacy is an
irreparable harm that would foreseeably result in the failure to enforce
these contracts.
Some commentators have criticized relying on public policy alone to
determine the validity of contracts as "inflexible in application, at odds
with the Code language, and difficult to utilize in giving protection
across the broad spectrum of contract relations." 39 3 Public policy and
unconscionability are imprecise means of determining when a contract
should be unenforceable on its terms. As an alternative, courts could
look to the guideposts of the Uniform Commercial Code's few
394
unalterable requirements, namely good faith.
388. Id.
389. Id. (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)); see also
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980) (referencing the historic duty of citizens to
report crimes).
390. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 502 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. 1972) (balancing
the competing policies of freedom of contract with punishment and retribution in determining that
an insurance policy covering punitive damages was not void as against public policy).
391.

392.
393.
394.
in fact

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).

H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, supra note 93, at 28.
Symons, supra note 98, at 240.
U.C.C. §§ 1-304 (2007); U.C.C. § 1-210(b)(20) (2007) (defining good faith as "honesty
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"); U.C.C. § 3-103
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In addition, a holistic conception of public policy should be multidimensional; the policy against interfering with an investigation does
not operate in a vacuum, but must instead be counterbalanced by
policies promoting financial privacy and freedom of contract. There are
strong public policy reasons for favoring financial privacy. Courts have
invoked the public policy of respecting confidentiality in a multitude of
contexts. For example, an Oregon state court held that an employee,
despite the at-will nature of his employment, could not be fired for
refusing to reveal confidential financial information, citing a public
policy exception to the at-will rule. 39 5 In the trade secret context,
confidentiality agreements are typically enforceable except in cases
when "public policy or the employee's interest outweighs the interest of
the employer." 396 In deciding whether to enforce these agreements,
states evaluate restrictions based on the nature of the employer's
interests that the restrictions are intended to protect, whether they are
reasonably related to this interest, how narrowly they are tailored, their
duration, and how reasonable they are from a public policy
standpoint. 39 7 Since courts have developed and implemented multifactorial tests to evaluate the validity of trade secret agreements, they
should be able to similarly formulate an approach to analyzing which
contracts requiring banks to challenge law enforcement inquiries on
behalf of their customers are enforceable and under what circumstances.
Furthermore, unlike the contracts that have been found void as
against public policy because they effectively bar reporting to law
enforcement authorities, the type of contract proposed here would
merely include a procedural hook-and one which was legislatively
created at that-to the disclosure process. 398 Some courts have
permitted conditional disclosure agreements in other contexts. For
example, the Federal District Court for the District of Kansas upheld a
settlement agreement that prevented the plaintiff from voluntarily

cmt. 4 (2007) (explaining that the good faith standard requires "fairness of conduct," not merely
the exercise of due care).
395. Banaitis v. Mitsubishi Bank, 879 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) ("In short, there is
no requirement... that a specific statute has been violated before we may conclude that a societal
obligation or a public duty has been implicated. We must review all the relevant 'evidence' of a
particular public policy, whether that be expressed in constitutional and statutory provisions or in
the caselaw of this or other jurisdictions.").
396. Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25
WM. MITCHELL L. REV 627,635 (1999).
397. Id.at641.
398. But see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Astra, 94 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir.
1996) ("In performing that balancing here, we must weigh the impact of settlement provisions
that effectively bar cooperation with the EEOC on the enforcement of Title VII...").
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399
cooperating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
In holding that the agreement was not void as against public policy, the
court found it persuasive that the provision did not prevent the plaintiff
from testifying in response to a subpoena.40 0 Similarly, in this case, the
proposed bank agreements would not bar disclosure altogether, but
would only apply congressionally-sanctioned safeguards to individual
cases.

C. Economic Feasibilityof Contractingfor Confidentialityand Place
In Part V.B, this Article addressed the enforceability of contracts
wherein banks would promise to challenge subpoenas on behalf of their
customers. In this Part, I will discuss whether the economics of such a
promise would be feasible given the added cost to the bank and
customer willingness to pay for this assurance.
Although case-specific data on the costs of challenging FISA
requests or NSLs are not publicly available, extrapolation from more
easily attainable data indicate that the costs, particularly when spread
across a large number of bank customers, would be negligible. In an
analogous consideration of the costs of challenging requests for
customer records, Congress was unconcerned about the price tag of the
proposed reform: when libraries challenge FISA requests, the litigation
costs for the library's side are funded by taxpayers who finance the
library's operation. 40 1 In passing S.2271, "[a] bill to clarify that
individuals who receive FISA orders can challenge nondisclosure
requirements," Congress projected that there would be "[no] discernable
40 2
cost" to taxpayers.
When courts have awarded attorney's fees for time spent preparing a
motion to quash a subpoena, they have usually found awards around
$5000 to be reasonable. 40 3 To be generous, let us estimate that it would

399. Hoffman v. United Telecomm., 687 F. Supp. 1512, 1515 (D. Kan. 1988).
400. See id. ("[The] settlement agreement limiting the plaintiffs cooperation in culminating
the twelve-year-old investigation is not void as against public policy.").
401. TheWeeklnCongress.com, http://www.theweekincongress.com/Member/MAR06_FULL
S2271 PATRIOTshMARI 0.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2007)
402. Id. ("S.2271, a bill to clarify that individuals who receive FISA orders can challenge
nondisclosure requirements, that individuals who receive national security letters are not required
to disclose the name of their attorney, that libraries are not wire or electronic service providers
unless they provide specific services, and for other purposes.").
403. E.g., In re Mullins, 87 F.3d 1372, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that fees arising from a
motion to quash were reasonable); Panico v. Panico, 2006 WL 3703399, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 14, 2006); Mot. to Quash and/or Limit Subpoena Duces Tecum at 13, In re N. Tex.
Specialty Physicians, No. 9312 (F.T.C. Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/
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cost a bank $10,000 in attorney hours to challenge any given request for
customer records. In 2005, there were approximately 2000 FISA
requests. 40 4 Only a fraction of these were for bank records, but to err on
the side of overestimation, let us assume that one-half related to
financial institutions. From these rough estimations, the total cost of
defending against all of the FISA requests would be $10 million.
According to the 2000 census, there are 210 million Americans over
the age of eighteen. 40 5 At least seventy-five percent of these individuals
are estimated to have some form of a bank account. 40 6 Accordingly,
there are more than 150 million bank customers across the country.
Given the estimated $10 million aggregate cost of challenging FISA
requests, requiring banks to file motions to quash these subpoenas
would average out to less than seven cents per customer.
There is some possibility of adverse selection: customers whose
behavior would make them more likely to be the target of government
investigation may accordingly be more inclined to opt for the assurance
that banks will challenge FISA requests on their behalf.40 7 However,
even if only the one percent of customers most likely to be investigated
selected to contract to require banks to challenge requests for their
records, the total cost to banks of following through on the contracts
would average out to be $6.67 per customer. Given the gravity of
concern for financial privacy evinced in surveys of the American
public, 40 8 it seems almost certain that many customers would value this
additional safeguard on their privacy enough to pay at least this amount
for it.409 Furthermore, the widespread concern for financial privacy

d9312/040107bcbsmotoquashorlimitsdt.pdf; Midwest Fin. Corp. v. Equity Holding Co., 12 P.3d
475, 476 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) ("Midwest was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs
incurred in responding to the Motion to Quash. The amount of fees and costs awarded
($5,422.71) was determined at a subsequent hearing.").
404. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, to J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Apr.
28,
2006),
available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.html.
405. JULIE MEYER, AGE: 2000, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (2001), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2001 pubs/c2kbrO l-1 2.pdf.
406. Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks to the Enterprise
Foundation's Annual Enterprise Network Conference, Generating Economic Opportunity for All
Americans (Oct. 13, 1999), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/sl53.htm (estimating that
"between ten and twenty percent of American households still do not have any type of transaction
account").
407. For a general discussion of adverse selection, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE
LAW & REGULATION 6-7 (4th ed. 2005).
408. See generally Thorsberg, supra note 191 (discussing PC World survey).
409. See generally Bibas, supra note 358 (discussing how prices account for individual
subjective valuations and reflect consumer preferences).
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suggests that these contracts would be quite popular with many bank
customers, and the more people who opt into the system, the lower the
cost per customer will be.
If twenty-five percent of bank customers are willing to pay a small
premium to require banks to challenge governmental inquiries on their
behalf, the price per customer will be only twenty-six cents under the
numbers and assumptions above, even assuming perfect adverse
selection. This suggests that even if the above analysis is off by an
order of magnitude, the price per customer would be low enough to
make the contracts to challenge requests for customer records
economically attractive and feasible.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Reauthorized Patriot Act empowers banks to protect their
customers from unwarranted government inquiries by challenging FISA
requests and NSLs. Although the terms of the Act provide banks with
an option rather than a directive, banks should be required to exercise
their newly granted powers in light of the promises they foster in their
contracts and privacy statements. These documents, which are drafted
and promulgated by banks, include express guarantees of confidentiality
and should be construed to conform to the standards established by
other financial privacy regulation. Given the place of confidentiality in
the bank-customer relationship as developed by tradition and codified in
federal and state legislation, banks should not blindly comply with
government requests for records when they are permitted to exercise
discretion in challenging FISA requests and NSLs.
Along with the obligations accrued under the current contractual
regime, financial institutions can offer their customers greater privacy
protection through contracts that explicitly obligate the institution to
review government inquiries and challenge them when appropriate. In
light of the recent congressional authorization of bank challenges to
subpoenas of customer records, these contracts should be enforceable as
consistent with public policy. Furthermore, given the small number of
FISA requests relative to the large number of bank customers, the
average cost per customer spent to challenge requests will be minimal.
If banks wish to pass this cost along to customers who desire greater
privacy protection, many customers will be willing to pay a small
premium for the assurance that banks will more closely guard their
personal information.

